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Panel III: Fair Use: Its Application, 
Limitations and Future 
Moderator: Sonia Katyal∗ 
Panelists: Paul Aiken† 
Laura Quilter‡ 
David O. Carson§ 
John G. Palfrey Jr.|| 
Hugh C. Hansen# 
 
MR. ZHANG: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  
Welcome to the Copyright Panel.  My name is Steven Zhang and I 
am the Symposium Editor of the Journal. 
This year our panel will be discussing the fair use issue—its 
application, limitations, and future.  We have a wonderful panel 
here.  I would like to thank everyone here, and also everyone who 
has been supporting us since June in the preparation of this 
Symposium.  I would also like to thank Professor Hansen, who is 
really the mastermind behind all this.  Without him, we could not 
prepare this Symposium. 
The moderator of this panel is Sonia Katyal.  She is teaching 
intellectual property law classes here at Fordham Law School, and 
also civil rights classes and property classes.  She has multiple 
publications on these subjects. 
Without further ado, I will turn it over to Professor Katyal. 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
† Executive Director, The Authors Guild. 
‡ Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University . 
§ General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office. 
|| Executive Director, The Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law 
School. 
# Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., Rutgers University, 
1968; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1972; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1977. 
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PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thanks so much. 
Greetings and thanks for coming to the final panel of our 
Intellectual Property Symposium for today, the much-awaited 
Copyright Panel, where we will focus on the ever-changing and 
ever-controversial issue of fair use. 
Let me actually just start off by thanking our distinguished 
panelists for coming to speak at Fordham today, and also the 
organizers of today’s Symposium; in addition, of course, to the 
staff and the moderators of the Fordham Intellectual Property, 
Media & Entertainment Law Journal, who have done a great job of 
selecting folks to talk about some of the various conflicts and 
considerations that we see in today’s changing field of intellectual 
property law. 
Sort of along these lines, fair use represents the best 
personification, in my view, of the various public and private 
considerations that animate the utilitarian balance within copyright 
law.  It is also an area that, despite its statutory construction, is 
meant to be inherently malleable and flexible in order to adapt to 
the changing obligations and considerations regarding new 
technologies. 
But it is also, precisely because of its malleability, incredibly 
subject to serious conflict and judicial variance in its interpretation.  
So the last few years have seen an enormously important slew of 
decisions regarding fair use—fair use in parody,1 fair use regarding 
peer-to-peer technologies,2 open access issues with respect to 
research, thumbnail photographs within search engines,3 anti-
circumvention issues, musical sampling, safe-harbor issues with 
respect to Internet service providers, and so on.  These are just a 
few of the issues that I think are currently challenging the fair use 
doctrine. 
Many of these cases turn on the foundational and more 
philosophically rich question of whether or not we should think 
 
 1 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 2 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 3 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 
416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
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about fair uses as a right, a privilege, a defense, or a limited 
creature of common law and statutory construction.  Many 
commentators and judges, some of whom are on this panel, often 
have different views on this question, which often animates the 
divergence between narrow and broad constructions of fair use. 
In addition, many of these issues are also overshadowed by the 
increasing reach of digital rights management and other 
technological controls over content that often foreclose or 
potentially narrow fair-use interests for consumers, often forcing 
us to explore whether or not fair use is becoming increasingly 
determined by technological controls rather than judicial 
constructions in its favor.  So all of this is happening within the 
law. 
But at the same time, outside of the law we see so many of 
these debates raging within the changing field of digital 
technology, where we actually see on the Web a tremendous 
explosion of illegitimate content through the use of sites like 
YouTube,4 prompting one commentator, Tim Wu, who is at 
Columbia, to herald a new phrase, the phenomenon of “tolerated 
use” rather than fair use, where copyright owners allow for a 
limited circulation of illegitimate content precisely because they 
recognize it either increases the market value of their brands or it 
does not necessarily harm preexisting markets in their content.5 
This confluence, a potential narrowing of fair use marked by a 
potential expansion of tolerated use, signifies perhaps a new role 
for copyright law and potentially a new role for digital content 
generally. 
Our speakers today are in many ways architects of the 
academic policy and judicial angles regarding fair use.  Allow me 
to just introduce them all and then we will hear from each one.  
Our first speaker will be Paul Aiken, Executive Director of The 
Authors Guild in New York.  Our second speaker will be Laura 
Quilter, who is Counsel at The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU 
 
 4 YouTube, http://www.youtube.com.  YouTube is a website that allows individuals to 
upload and share video clips. 
 5 See Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really Have Legal Problems?, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2006, 
http://slate.com/id/2152264. 
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School of Law.  Our third speaker will be David Carson, who 
serves as General Counsel for the U.S. Copyright Office in 
Washington, D.C.  Fourth we will hear from John Palfrey, who is 
Executive Director of The Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society at Harvard Law School.  Last, but definitely never least, 
we will hear from our own Hugh Hansen, Professor at Fordham 
School of Law. 
Thank you so much.  Let’s actually start.  I will turn things 
over to Paul.  Thank you. 
MR. AIKEN: Thank you, Sonia. 
Let me start things out.  There has been an increasingly fierce 
debate about fair use in all sorts of forums and all sorts of media.  I 
thought I would start by talking about some of the broad public 
policy concerns, starting at the most basic with copyright itself, the 
public policy issues around copyright. 
Often we are told that we have to balance the interests between 
rights holders and the public when we look at copyright issues.  I 
think that is largely a false distinction.  In many ways, the public’s 
interests are perfectly lined up with rightsholders’, because the 
interest in both is to create a real market for copyrighted goods. 
The public’s interest is in creating a market for books, movies, 
and music so people can go out and buy books, movies, and music 
that they value.  When we hear that the public’s interest is in, say, 
a large public domain, that is partly right.  There is of course a 
genuine interest in a public domain, but that interest is secondary, 
and always has been secondary in copyright.  Easily 90 percent of 
the value that copyright creates is in the market itself.  We have to 
be careful that we do not undermine that market as we act in the 
supposed interest of the public or we risk destroying what we 
intended to create. 
We have in this country a very strong market in food.  No one 
asks, “What is the public’s interest in the food market?  I want to 
go to the market and get potatoes for free.”  We do not talk in those 
terms.  We understand that just by creating a market for food, 
allowing people to go to the market and easily buy potatoes, we are 
acting in the public interest. 
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Another myth about copyright is that copyright is frequently 
spoken of as a monopoly.  I guess in some sense it is a monopoly.  
It is a monopoly in the same sense that I have a monopoly in the 
use of my car or my house—I can decide how it is used; I can 
decide who is allowed in and who is not allowed in.  But it is a 
very weak monopoly. 
The types of monopolies we are concerned about as a matter of 
policy are those sorts that allow one to corner a market.  A 
copyright monopoly in almost all instances does not allow one to 
corner a market.  If Dan Brown, who wrote The Da Vinci Code, 
and Random House think they have a monopoly and so with his 
next book decide to charge $90, they will quickly find out that they 
do not have a monopoly, that the relevant market is not Dan Brown 
books but novels generally, or mystery novels or thrillers 
generally.  Copyright is not the sort of monopoly that we should be 
concerned about. 
Copyright is often spoken of—a third myth—as locking up 
ideas.  Copyright does not.  This is fundamental but bears 
repeating.  Copyright protects expression, not ideas.6  Most 
lawyers, of course, know this, but I hear this misrepresented time 
and again, even by experts, copyright professors, that copyright is 
somehow locking up ideas.  It does not.  It just locks up 
expression, the creative expressions of authors and others, and 
allows them to make money on those works through the 
marketplace. 
Paul Goldstein of Stanford Law School often speaks of the 
idea-expression dichotomy as creating a vast commons coursing 
through every copyrighted work, the publicly held and freely 
copyable ideas the work contains.7  Certainly that is right. 
If a particular author has creatively expressed an idea so well 
that another feels compelled to copy that particular expression, 
then one needs permission—that is, a license—and that is as it 
 
 6 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 7 See Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Commons, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2005–2006); 
Fair Use: Its Effects on Consumers and Industry: Hearing Before Subcomm. On 
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, 108th Cong. 6 (2005) (Statement of Paul 
Aiken, Author’s Guild), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/ 
Hearings/11162005hearing1716/Aiken.pdf. 
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should be.  A well-crafted expression should be compensated, or 
the borrower should simply limit the excerpt to the bounds of fair 
use. 
Now let’s move on to fair use in particular.  We are told time 
and again that in order for a copyright to fulfill its constitutional 
purpose of promoting the arts and useful sciences and to provide a 
real public benefit, we have to make sure fair use is adequately 
broad.8  But this misapprehends the primary value of copyright, as 
we have seen, and the role of fair use in the copyright system. 
Fair use, as most of you know, was originally a judicial 
doctrine, now codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act.9  It has 
traditionally helped define the boundary between commerce and 
free expression, between the commercial incentives secured by 
copyright and the right to free expression protected by the First 
Amendment. 
Authors, of course, are really big fans of copyright, because 
authors like to get paid.  But they are also big fans of traditional, 
transformative fair use.  Say an author is writing a history of the 
Great Depression and finds a recent article in which some scholar 
says that the Depression was caused by the stock market crash of 
1929.  This drives the author nuts, because she believes it is well 
established that the stock market crash was only one of several 
factors causing the Depression.  She wants to quote from this 
article to show just how wrongheaded it is.  But the article is 
protected by copyright and its author may not be inclined to grant 
her permission to excerpt the work. 
So what does our historian do?  She uses it anyway.  She 
copies a reasonable amount of that article, enough to make her 
point, and puts it into her own book, surrounding it with her 
commentary and criticism.  She demolishes the scholar’s thesis 
using his own words against him, and there is nothing that author 
can do about it. 
 
 8 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). 
 9 Id. at 576. “Fair use doctrine remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the 
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act.” Id.  Compare Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–
45 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
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That author can do nothing about it, at least in terms of her use 
of his copyrighted work, because this is classical transformative 
fair use of the original author’s work.10  She has taken a part of his 
copyrighted work and transformed it, including it in a new creative 
expression, something completely unlike his work. 
As a society, we see real value in this sort of transformative 
borrowing from another’s work.  It is a vital part of the 
marketplace of ideas that free expression is meant to encourage.  
And it is everywhere—in book and movie reviews, of course; 
biographical and historical works; scientific and academic books 
and journals; novels and plays; poetry and songs. 
Section 107 mediates between protected expression and free 
expression by setting forth four factors for a court to weigh in 
considering whether a use is fair, factors intended to permit the 
excerpting of copyrighted works needed for new creative 
expression, so long as the effect on the commercial market for the 
work is minimal.11 
An unfortunate result of the use of four factors to determine the 
bounds of fair use is that fair use appears to be a bit mushy.  
Advocates of all stripes can and do read into fair use what they 
care to read into it. 
Fair use now is often seen as another flavor of the public 
domain.  That is perhaps one way to think of it, but it is of an 
entirely different nature than copyright’s real public domain.  Fair 
use does not mean free use of entire works; that is the realm of 
genuine public domain.  Fair use, in fact, has been transmuted by 
some into free use or good use or any other use that some interest 
group, industry, or a corporation wants to make of copyrighted 
works without paying for them.  This is not, and should not, be 
what fair use is about.  If we keep our eye on the true role of fair 
use—permitting the creation of new creative expressions without 
harming the commercial market for the work—we will not lose our 
way. 
Let me close there for my opening remarks. 
 
 10 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000); Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (discussing “transformative”). 
 11 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590. 
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PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thank you. 
Next we will hear from Laura Quilter. 
MS. QUILTER: Thank you, Paul and Sonia. 
Fair use, I think, is something that I am very supportive of, as a 
creator myself and as a general advocate for free expression.  Fair 
use is shaped significantly by public policy and by statute, as Paul 
has gone over with us.  But it is also shaped significantly by the 
actual practice of private parties, and that is what I want to talk 
about today, how private parties interact with fair use in the most 
common way in which copyright disputes are handled.  That 
includes looking at cease-and-desist letters, looking at the initial 
sorts of ways that people attempt to resolve disputes. 
Let me back up from there and say several years ago, in the 
mid- to late-1990s, copyright holders, the large entertainment 
industries in particular, were very concerned about copyright 
infringement taking place on the Internet.  And so, among other 
things, they spoke to Congress about trying to get some way to 
deal with this in the most expedient way possible, which would be 
to go after Internet service providers and get them to take material 
down when it was plainly infringing.  So they were really 
concerned basically that somebody would be posting significant 
numbers of MP3s to their Web sites. 
The ISPs got involved in this.  Together, they ended up crafting 
in Congress a series of provisions for the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which are perhaps lesser known than 
the § 1201 anti-circumvention provisions but which have turned 
out to be very significant in mediating how people actually interact 
with copyright. 
These provisions basically set forth a series of safe harbors, 
limited and contingent safe harbors, for Internet service 
providers—what I call “online service providers” [hereinafter 
“OSP”] after the statute—based on what kind of online service 
they provide and what they have to do to get access to the safe 
harbor.  I am going to run through those very quickly, and then I 
am going to tell you a little bit about three studies that have gone 
on already and that are progressing that really look at how this 
actually plays out in the real world. 
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Of these provisions, there are three that are the most relevant 
and important provisions of § 512 for you guys to think about. 
The first one is § 512(a), which directs what online Internet 
access providers have to do.12  This one is a fairly straightforward 
safe harbor.  It says that Internet access providers—meaning your 
broadband, your dial-up, your DSL provider, your cable 
provider—have a safe harbor so long as they develop and 
reasonably implement a takedown provision for repeat infringers.13  
But other than that, if they have a policy that they implement for 
repeat infringers, they are good.  They do not have to worry about 
being possibly liable for their subscribers’ copyright 
infringements.14 
Now, this one is important, because the broadband providers—
Comcast and AT&T and Earthlink—are the ones who are 
providing access to the peer-to-peer file sharers.  This was not even 
a twinkle in the eyes of the copyright and ISP industries in 1998 
when the DMCA was drafted.  So they were happy to concede, 
“Hey, let’s get a straightforward safe harbor and move on.” 
They moved on to § 512(c), which has a fairly elaborated 
notice and takedown process.  Section 512(c) applies to your Web 
hosts basically, people who are running computer systems and 
hosting somebody else’s content—your Web hosts, your email 
lists, archive providers, those kinds of people.15 
It includes this notice and takedown process, which says if you 
are a copyright holder and you feel that somebody’s work is 
infringing on a Web site, you can send a notice, and so long as the 
OSP expeditiously removes the content or disables access to it, the 
OSP has a safe harbor from potential copyright liability for hosting 
that material.16 
There is a counter-notice provision, which says, “Hey, if the 
user, the subscriber to the service, feels that they were wronged, 
 
 12 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. § 512(c). 
 16 Id. § 512(c)(1), (3). 
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they can submit a counter-notice and say ‘put it back up,’ and after 
a certain amount of back and forth, the material can go back up.”17 
So § 512(c) is the most elaborated process in this statutory 
scheme. 
Section 512(d), interestingly, applies to information location 
tools, search engines.  It provides a safe harbor for linking to 
content that could be infringing.18  It is really questionable, if you 
think about it, what sort of infringement might have occurred 
anyway.  If you simply tell someone where to go to find 
something, maybe you are enabling it. 
The case law was really not there.  So one might wonder what 
they were bargaining for when they were in Congress trying to get 
this.  But basically it says: “If you provide notice to a search 
engine, if you provide notice to Google, that they are linking in 
their search engine to somebody who is infringing copyright, if 
they take it down, they have a safe harbor from whatever liability 
they might have had for linking to that content.”19 
There is no counter-notice provision attached to that because 
the people who are at the search engine are indexing, they are not 
clients of the search engine.  The search engine owes them no duty.  
There is really no good reason to give them a counter-notice 
process. 
A couple of other provisions to note: 
Section 512(f) offers a remedy for intentional 
misrepresentations by either notice senders or counter-notice 
senders.20  That remedy is available to the OSP, to the notice 
recipient (the notice target), or to the notice sender, depending on 
who is making the misrepresentation.21 
Section 512(h) offers a subpoena process for copyright holders 
to get access to the identities of people who are posting 
information.22 
 
 17 Id. § 512(g). 
 18 Id. § 512(d). 
 19 Id. § 512(d)(1)(C). 
 20 Id. § 512(f). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. § 512(h). 
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So there is the system.  It was set up with a vision of massive 
amounts of infringing content being posted on Web sites. 
Well, it turns out that the massive amounts of infringing 
content were posted in people’s homes, on their own personal 
machines and not on hosted machines, so the notice provisions for 
§ 512(c) that were well articulated for Web hosts really did not 
apply.23 
That is the legal layout of the land. 
Now, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of legal 
scholars, including Wendy Seltzer, who led the initiative, became 
concerned that the ways in which copyright and other intellectual 
property disputes were being mediated very informally and very 
rapidly with cease-and-desist letters and they were worried about 
the potential free expression issues.24  They set up a database of 
cease-and-desist letters, called the Chilling Effects 
Clearinghouse.25  That has become largely a database of § 512 
notices, because there are so many of them being sent.  With this 
database, two different projects have looked at the results.  I am 
going to very quickly talk about those and then quickly talk about 
the follow-up work I am doing. 
The first project was done by Marjorie Heins, a colleague of 
mine.26  It basically looked at all of the trademark and copyright, 
including § 512, notices from the year 2004 in the Chilling Effects 
Database.  Many of these were submitted by Google, which 
submits all of its notices to the database. 
They basically found that the take-home is that twenty-one 
percent of all the notices they looked at presented either very weak 
 
 23 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), with, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918–20 (2005). 
 24 Jennifer Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or ‘Chilling Effects’? Takedown 
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006); Wendy Seltzer, Chilling Effects 
Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2007). 
 25 See Seltzer, supra note 24. 
 26 See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR 
USE SURVIVE? (2005), http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf.  
Marjorie Heins directs the Free Expression Policy Project at the National Coalition 
Against Censorship (http://www.fepproject.org). 
PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807 5/8/2007  1:04:06 PM 
1028 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:1017 
initial underlying claims or strong, or reasonably strong, fair use of 
free expression or other defenses.  Of those notices, about thirty-
one out of fifty-four of them—they looked at a set of about 320 
notices in total—or thirty-seven percent, ended up being removed 
from the Internet.  So thirty-seven percent of notices that presented 
a strong fair use claim or a reasonable fair use claim or a weak 
underlying substantive claim to begin with ended up getting taken 
off the Internet. 
I point this out because, from First Amendment perspectives, if 
you look at this process, it is effectively a prior restraint with no 
judicial review, because the § 512(f) standard says, “Hey, if there 
is an intentional misrepresentation, you can deal with it.”27  An 
intentional misrepresentation is an extremely high standard to 
meet.  It turns out that § 512(g), the counter-notice provision,28 for 
various reasons is rarely used and tends to be fairly ineffective.  So 
that was the first study. 
The second study, which I was working on with Jennifer 
Urban, a colleague of mine at USC, came out just a little bit after 
that.29  We basically looked at only § 512 notices.  We looked at 
close to 900 of them, covering a period from 2002 to 2006.  We 
found somewhat different findings, because we were looking at a 
different set of notices. 
The fair use findings: we found slightly higher percentages of 
fair use and invalid claims and those kinds of things; we found 
closer to thirty percent.  So I think you can ballpark and say 
between twenty and thirty percent of these claims that we were 
looking at—which, again, is a particular circumscribed set—were 
problematic substantively. 
I found a few other things more interesting, in a sense, about 
what we found. 
One is that § 512(d), the search engine takedown provision,30 is 
tremendously popular and it has basically become a tool in the 
search engine ranking wars. People are complaining that their 
 
 27 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2000). 
 28 Id. § 512(g). 
 29 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 24. 
 30 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000). 
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metatags are being used, that their short, pithy phrases that 
describe this or that product, have been appropriated by somebody 
else and are being used and that that other person has ranking.  
They are quite explicit about this.  They say “and now they have a 
number one ranking in Google and I have a number three ranking.”  
So they are very unhappy about this. 
Another key finding is that fifty-five percent of the search 
engine notices related to competitors that were these kinds of 
notices—advertising jargon, relatively short phrases—really, 
almost all of them were of questionable copyright.  But we took a 
fairly conservative approach in looking through the fair use on 
that.  Those notices are increasing.  So the § 512(d) notices are the 
most popular sorts of notices that are being sent under §§ 512(c) 
and (d). 
Third, the movie and music industries, and more generally the 
creative industries, do not use the §§ 512(c) and (d) processes.31  
This is not surprising.  The §§ 512(c) and (d) processes are for 
Web hosting and Internet search indexing, and the vast majority of 
infringements of music and movies are being done on peer-to-peer, 
which are § 512(a) processes.  So they really don’t have a reason to 
use the §§ 512(c) and (d) provisions.  They are sending mass 
numbers of notices, but they are not “takedown” notices. 
Fourth, people who start sending notices keep on sending them, 
so half of the notices that we saw were from repeat senders. 
Fifth, the procedural flaws in the notices were significant.  
Thirty-one percent of the notices presented significant procedural 
problems that rendered them technically unenforceable under the 
statute.  In fact, we discovered later on that the numbers were 
actually considerably worse than that, because Google, who had 
told us they were submitting all of their notices, actually cleared 
out the very worst notices that presented the most substantive flaws 
before ever submitting them to Chilling Effects.  So we never even 
got to see those because they just bounced them back. 
We found a number of other areas that we just flagged as 
problems.  People were sending notices for anti-circumvention 
 
 31 Urban & Quilter, supra note 24, at 651. 
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claims, which for technical reasons really don’t belong under the 
§ 512 process. 
The § 512(a) notices were kind of a mess.  It turns out that 
some § 512(a) providers typically treat repeat allegations as repeat 
infringement.  This turns out to be very problematic because the 
people who are sending all the § 512 notices make numerous 
errors. 
Let me spend thirty seconds on the work I am doing now, 
which is talking to OSPs about what they are doing about this and 
how they are treating it.  It turns out, not surprisingly, that people 
are very confused about these distinctions.  If I have gone too fast 
for you in this meeting over the categories of service providers, 
imagine being a very small service provider or a small educational 
institution and trying to figure out what you do with these things.  
People do not know, and so they default to treating everything, the 
small providers, as a takedown process. 
If they have a student who is using a peer-to-peer file-sharing 
program, then they just automatically treat that as a takedown.  
Now, they cannot take down content, because it is on the student’s 
machine, so they disable Internet access.  For me, this is a 
significant free expression concern—not because I do not take 
copyright infringement seriously, but because Internet access is 
used for significantly more things than merely infringing 
copyright.  Internet access is used as perhaps the premier speech 
platform for millions—if not billions by now—people in the world, 
and cutting it off is a real problem. 
I will make two more quick points about what I am finding 
now. 
The counter-notice process is virtually never used, for various 
reasons. 
And lastly, rights enforcement companies, this little set of 
businesses that have developed in the wake of the DMCA, are a 
real problem.  They send massive numbers of notices, which a lot 
of OSPs describe as virtually like spam.  They are worse than 
spam, because the OSPs actually have to spend time processing 
them, instead of just deleting them. 
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And they do not respond to complaints.  So if a rights 
enforcement company sends a notice to an OSP and the OSP says, 
“Hey, I actually don’t even own that IP address”—and this is not 
uncommon; OSPs report sometimes receiving forty or fifty such 
notices a day—“I do not have that IP address, it is not a server, it 
could not possibly hold files,” whatever the reason is, it is 
impossible to get back in touch with the companies, because they 
just have automatic machines sending those things out.  And they 
might be staffed by a very small number of people who just do not 
bother checking their voicemail or their faxes, apparently. 
In conclusion, I would say that copyright is an issue.  How it is 
being worked out in § 512 is a matter for concern, not from the 
copyright perspective, so much as it is from the speech perspective.  
I do not think that the process is working very well for the 
entertainment industry as well. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thank you. 
Our next speaker is David Carson from the Copyright Office. 
MR. CARSON: I am probably going to spend most of my time 
talking about another part of the DMCA, § 1201,32 which has more 
or less taken over my life in the last few weeks, to the point where 
I am probably incapable of talking about anything other than that.  
But I will first start with a few general observations about fair use. 
I am operating under a handicap, because I first studied 
copyright law in 1980, right after the enactment of the 1976 
Copyright Act,33 and we started by looking at the actual words of 
§ 107,34 which I think is an impediment if you want to understand 
what most people think fair use is all about. 
It is, of course, a judge-made doctrine, not a statutory 
provision.  But Congress at least thought that what it was doing in 
1976 was codifying that judge-made doctrine.35  Paul did what 
 
 32 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). 
 33 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 1541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–803 
(2000). 
 34 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 35 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 94th Cong. (1976) [hereinafter 1976 House Report]. 
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most people do when they looked at that statute—he jumped right 
to those four factors, which of course are very, very important. 
But what most people seem to do is to ignore the first 
paragraph of § 107, which really, I think, sets the scene and sets 
the context for what fair use really has always been about.  What it 
says is, to jump to the heart of it: “[F]air use . . . including such use 
by reproduction . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.”36  Then it goes on to list those four 
factors. 
Now, I was in private practice during the 1980s and a good 
deal of the 1990s and I encountered fair use quite a bit.  I asserted 
fair use quite a bit.  I have to say I think every time I encountered 
it, either as a proponent or opponent―usually as a proponent, as it 
turns out―it was in those contexts of criticism, comment, 
scholarship, and research.  I would submit that that is really what 
the bulk of our history of fair use in this country, going back to 
Folsom v. Marsh,37 is all about. 
Somewhere along the line, though, between 1976 and today, at 
least in the popular conception―but I would submit not in the 
conception of the courts for the most part―fair use seems to have 
mutated.  It has reached a point now where I think for most people 
fair use is defined as “anything I want to do with somebody else’s 
copyrighted work that I do not think I should be penalized for 
doing.” 
Now, I may feel this way more than some people do, because I 
have for the last year been dealing with rulemaking, which I will 
be talking about in a few minutes, where people make arguments 
to us about the fair uses they have been unable to engage in and the 
reasons they should be able to engage in them and why technology 
is imposing impediments and why they should be permitted to 
overcome those technological impediments. 
The vast majority of the so-called “fair uses” that I have seen 
people tell us that they ought to be able to engage in are uses that I 
 
 36 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 37 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
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would call uses for purposes of private copying―“I bought a 
legitimate copy of this work.  I want to make additional copies for 
myself.  I want to be able to listen to the music in my car.  I want 
to be able to see the movie at my vacation home or on my yacht.”  
We can all sympathize with that, right?  Or “I want to give it to a 
friend or a bunch of my friends―as a gift, of course; I am not 
going to get any money for it.  So that’s a fair use, right?” 
Well, I would say no, no way, not even close.  That has nothing 
to do with fair use, and fair use historically has never had anything 
to do with that. 
Now, of course, the first thing you hear from folks, and the first 
thing I read in submissions from many folks about this is, “Well, 
wait a minute.  That is what the Supreme Court told us in 1984, in 
the Sony v. Universal case, the Betamax case38 that private copying 
is all right.” 
That is not what the Supreme Court told us, of course.  What 
the Supreme Court told us was that time-shifting of on-the-air, 
publicly broadcast television programs, so that if you miss the 
show at eight o’clock you can watch it at nine o’clock or the next 
day or next Tuesday and then get rid of it, is fair use.39  The Court 
expressly did not talk about making your own personal copy to 
keep.40  I do not think any court has ever talked about that, and it 
certainly has not said it is fair use. 
But that seems to be the popular conception, and that is 
something that I think needs to be dispelled.  But it is in the air and 
it is hard to dispel.  Fortunately, as I said, there is precious little 
legal authority for the proposition, but plenty of people seem to 
believe it. 
Now, fair use is, of course, as the Supreme Court said, and as 
Congress said in its legislative history for the 1976 Act, an 
equitable rule of reason; it is not something you apply rigidly.41  
 
 38 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 39 Id. at 455 (holding that “home time shifting is fair use”). 
 40 Compare id. at 458–59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (indicating that video library 
building is an issue), with id. at 421 (summarizing the majority analysis without 
mentioning library building). 
 41 See 1976 House Report, supra note 35; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 577–79 (1994). 
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You cannot read § 107 and say, “Okay, I know what it is.  It is 
clearly outlined.  We know what we can do.  We know what we 
can’t do.”  There is, I will grant, some degree of subjectivity.  You 
get any two copyright lawyers together―experienced, reasonable 
copyright lawyers―and present them with a particular scenario, 
and there is a good chance that they will disagree with respect to 
whether what is happening is or is not fair use.  I have those 
debates all the time. 
One thing we hear in the debate over fair use is, “Is it a good 
thing or is it a bad thing that fair use isn’t a black-and-white 
matter?”  As a lawyer, and as someone who finds copyright to be a 
really interesting area of law, I would submit it is a really good 
thing.  To me it is the most fascinating part of copyright law, really 
getting your teeth into a fair use issue and trying to figure out 
whether a particular use is or isn’t fair, and going through all the 
arguments pro and con. 
But the counterargument to that is: How do people out there in 
the real world who want to figure out “can I do this or can’t I do 
this?” govern themselves?  They go to a copyright lawyer, and the 
copyright lawyer will tell them, “On the one hand, yes; on the 
other hand, no; and the answer is maybe.”  That is a real problem, 
and I do not have the answer. 
One answer that is proposed is let’s codify it in much more 
detail, which is what a lot of other systems, such as civil law 
systems, do.42  They tell you precisely what you can and cannot do, 
usually in a much less generous fashion than I think our courts 
have done when they have considered fair use on a case-by-case 
basis. 
But I take the point that if you are not a copyright expert―and 
even if you are a copyright expert―you do not necessarily have 
assurance in a given case as to whether something is or is not fair 
use. 
So that is the overview of where I come from when I look at 
fair use.  But let’s talk about what I have been focusing on 
recently, and that is a rulemaking proceeding that the Digital 
 
 42 See, e.g., Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle [C. PROP. INT.] (FR.). 
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Millennium Copyright Act delegated to the Register of Copyrights 
and the Librarian of Congress. 
The rulemaking relates to the provision in § 1201(a)(1), which 
was added by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.43  The basic 
provision in § 1201 is: “No person shall circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title.”44 
So, to take the most well-known access control, when you buy 
a DVD of a popular motion picture, it is going to have something 
called CSS, the Content Scrambling System, on it.  CSS is an 
access control.  It is an access control in that you can only play that 
DVD on a DVD player that has been licensed to play that DVD.  
The people who license the DVD players make sure that anyone 
who operates under that license cannot have a digital output from 
that machine that is playing the DVD, the whole notion being we 
want to prevent people from making unlawful copies.  It is an 
access control in that it controls your access.  You can only access 
the content on the DVD by putting it in an authorized player. 
Access controls can be other things too.  Password protection is 
an access control.  If you are able to break through the password 
protection on, say, a Web site that is only open to subscribers, you 
are violating § 1201(a)(1).45 
But as the DMCA was going through Congress, the original 
version just had that prohibition, flat out; that was it.  When it got 
to the Commerce Committee, which considered itself at that point 
the protector or champion of fair use—which is interesting, 
because the provision came out of the Judiciary Committee, which 
is typically considered the committee that thinks about 
copyright―the Commerce Committee said: “Wait a minute.  Well 
and good, we understand why copyright owners need to do this.  
We understand the need to give them some legal teeth behind the 
technological measures that they are deploying.  But what happens 
if everything gets locked up?  What happens if people are not able 
to engage in what are clearly non-infringing activities because 
 
 43 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. 
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there are these technological measures applied to their works and 
people can’t do what in the old-fashioned hardcopy world they 
always could do?  I can pick up a book from the library shelf and 
read it; I can’t pick up a CD and read it.” 
In particular, the Commerce Committee was concerned about 
fair use.  Because of that, they tasked the Secretary of 
Commerce―but by the time it got out of Congress it was the 
Librarian of Congress, on the recommendation of the Register of 
Copyrights―who had the task of conducting a rulemaking 
proceeding every three years to determine whether there are any 
particular classes of works with respect to which the ability of 
users to engage in non-infringing uses is being adversely affected 
by the prohibition on circumvention of technological measures that 
control access.46  None of you understand what I just said.  If you 
do, you are very bright, because it took me a long time to digest it 
and figure out what it meant. 
What it means basically is that if we find, based upon what is 
happening out there in the real world, that technological measures, 
access controls, are being deployed on works in a way that is 
actually preventing people from engaging in non-infringing uses, 
we may exempt the classes of works with respect to which those 
technological measures are being deployed. 
With respect to DVDs for example, we can say, “Fine, motion 
pictures on DVDs are exempt.  People who are engaging in non-
infringing uses may break through CSS if we find that the facts 
warrant that.”  So far we haven’t in two rulemakings.  We are in 
our third now, and within the last twenty-four hours the Register of 
Copyrights has completed her recommendation, and the Librarian 
of Congress may well, as early as next week, make his final 
conclusion based upon those recommendations.  You may see the 
announcement as early as the Monday after Thanksgiving. 
What kinds of fair uses have we found?  Well, I’ll just mention 
a couple that we found, and I may talk about, if I have time, how 
 
 46 See id. § 1201 (a)(1)(c); see also The Register of Copyrights: Before the Committee 
on House Appropriations, 2005 WL 1222535 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of MaryBeth Peters, 
Register of Copyrights). 
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our approach may actually be changing this year in some 
interesting ways. 
One of the things that we have done―we did it in 2000,47 and 
we did it in 200348―related to situations having to do with 
software that you can put on your computer to prevent your 
children from going to sites on the Internet that you may not want 
them to go to.  We exempted a class consisting of “compilations 
consisting of lists of Internet locations blocked by commercially 
marketed filtering software applications that are intended to 
prevent access to domains, websites, or portions of websites.”49  
That’s the main thing.  We teased it out a little bit with some 
details, but that’s the essential language of the exempted class. 
We learned that filtering software that prevents you from going 
to websites that the people who sell that filtering software think are 
inappropriate for children, for example, has been subject to a lot of 
criticism.  Critics, since it has first been deployed, have argued that 
it over-protects, it keeps you from going to websites that anyone 
should be able to go to.  How can you critique that software if you 
do not know what it is that the software is preventing you from 
going to, because it is in a list that is encrypted?  You’ve got to 
break through that encryption to get to it. 
We considered this to be classic fair use.  You should be able 
to get access to those lists if what you are doing is critiquing the 
software so you can tell whether it is doing the job well or poorly, 
advise consumers whether it is a good thing to buy or a bad thing 
to buy.  If the only way to do that is to break through the 
encryption, then so be it, you can do that.  So we found there was a 
fair use, we found the case had been made, and we issued the 
exemption. 
My time is up, so maybe in the discussion, if people want to go 
there, I can talk a little bit more about this year’s rulemaking. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Next we will hear from John Palfrey 
from The Berkman Center. 
 
 47 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2000). 
 48 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2003). 
 49 Id.  For the text of the current regulation, see 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2006). 
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MR. PALFREY: Sonia, thank you so much. 
I am sorry to say I am going to use the crutch of digital 
technology here.  Everybody else has so brilliantly avoided doing 
that.  So brilliant, in fact, is my colleague Professor Hansen down 
there on the end, that he does not need a presentation, because he 
always puts himself at the end and then writes his presentation 
while others are talking, which is quite extraordinary.  I have 
absolutely no hope of accomplishing that. 
Thank you to Sonia and the student organizers.  This is an 
extraordinary forum and I am delighted to have been invited. 
[Slide]  I come from a little research center at the Havard Law 
School, called The Berkman Center for Internet and Society.  It has 
been referred to relatively recently, once in The New York Times 
Magazine, as “the intellectual hub of the Copy Left.”50  I also saw 
a blog post the other day that called us “The Berkman Center for 
Copyhate”51―that was a new one. 
I am ordinarily in the pose of saying that fair use, a very strong 
sense of fair use, broad sense of fair use, is a great thing.  In order 
just to be slightly provocative, and given that there is rethinking 
and redefining the boundaries as our title, I wanted to actually look 
a little bit at the extent to which there are limits to fair use, and to 
do so by kind of fast-forwarding into the world of Web 2.0, or the 
user-generated content space. 
Everybody may have seen the transaction of Google buying 
YouTube for $1.65 billion.  Much of the discussion in the wake of 
that transaction, of course, was: Is there a copyright problem 
underlying YouTube; is Google buying itself a whole lot of 
lawsuits?  We heard about the “tolerated use” line from Tim Wu,52 
which is a great one.  There are lots of rumors as to whether or not 
they reserved a whole bunch of money to pay off the copyright 
holders.  Certainly, the first thing they did was to sign up deals 
 
 50 Robert S. Boynton, The Tryanny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 25, 
2004. 
 51 Christian L. Castle, Anybody, anybody . . . , MUSIC TECH. POLICY, Sept. 24, 2006, 
http://music-tech-policy.blogspot.com/2006/09/anybody-anybody.html. 
 52 See Wu, supra note 5. 
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with Warner Music, and they are now going over to the movie 
industry. 
But what I wanted to talk about actually is, what about the 
other stuff in the YouTube zone, or in the Web at large, that is 
created by users that might use some of this stuff, or be reused by 
other users in contexts, which don’t touch on the rights that Warner 
in the music context or the movie industry might also have? 
So I am thinking about the Web 2.0 stuff that you think of as 
truly user-generated content and the extent to which fair use is 
really important in this context.  People reuse other people’s stuff 
all the time, re-aggregating it, but do so in a way that is not 
particularly clearly described. 
A big phenomenon.  Everybody who has children in the age of 
zero to twenty or so understands this.  But there is a sense of this 
generation being slightly different in the way that they use digital 
technologies.  Think of it as digital natives, people who are born 
digital, as opposed to those of us who came to be digital. 
[Slide]  One of the huge things that digital natives do, of 
course, is participate in this citizen-generated media space. 
How many people here blog? [Show of hands] 
That’s pretty good actually.  Maybe twenty-five percent. 
Any podcasters?  Anybody create audio? [Show of hands] 
People who create videos, who post to YouTube or anything 
like that?  [Show of hands]  A couple people. 
So fewer going down the line, but I think it is clearly a trend in 
terms of people creating more and more their own content.  I 
would stipulate that digital natives are doing this a lot. 
Likewise, people are sharing and creating together, Wikipedia 
being the clearest example of this.53  Wiki as a productivity tool of 
digital natives is well known. 
And then, lots of people re-aggregating other people’s content, 
so finding what is the best of the digital natives’ content that they 
have created in the Web 2.0 space and then re-aggregating it. 
 
 53 Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org.  “Wikipedia is an encyclopedia collaboratively 
written by many of its readers.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Introduction. 
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This ties, of course, very closely to the creation of digital 
identity.  It is a problem that does not exactly bear on the copyright 
space, but think about a young person who is creating the way that 
they are found on the Web.  For a lot of the time, it is the creativity 
that they are making, which is then sort of mashed up into a 
MySpace page or a Facebook page.54 
Of course, many of the things that are being used and 
commented on are digital media; they are things that have come 
out of the space that is copyright holders. 
Critically important to this is the Web 2.0 technology layer.  
Think about the kind of creativity here that young people are 
doing.  It is often a mash-up; it is often using technologies that let 
you mash lots of different bits of digital things.  And think about 
sort of art as collage.  This is a different way of thinking about 
what it means to create something.  But it is something that also 
has in its way some problems in the copyright context. 
One of the good parts of this, of course, is that there are new 
contexts and new meaning that are being created.  Scholars like 
Jack Balkin at Yale,55 Yochai Benckler also at Yale,56 and Terry 
Fisher at Harvard,57 have talked a lot about this creation of 
semiotic democracy, the ability to tell your own story, and to do so 
often in international contexts or cross-cultural contexts. 
So I think that the dominant thrust here is consumers, young 
consumers, becoming creators in this space.  So think about the 
world of authors, expanding substantially who is in fact an author, 
and creating these smaller works in digital form on the Web, but 
then with the mode of creativity in fact being to mash them up, but 
not having sort of a massive rights clearance layer there. 
To me this presents an issue for copyright. That is what I 
would call the primary threat of this movement in the intellectual 
 
 54 http://www.myspace.com; http://www.facebook.com.  MySpace and Facebook are 
online communities in which users create their own “home pages.” 
 55 Jack Balkin, Digital Speed and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 56 Yochai Benckler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of 
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003). 
 57 William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1203 (1998). 
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property zone.  There are a bunch of arguments about this, why it 
might not be an issue. 
One argument is people do not really want to get paid.  People 
who put their works on YouTube, you presume they put it out 
there and then the people who created YouTube sold it for 
$1 billion.  You didn’t ask for any money.  Most bloggers don’t 
ask for any money.  But, increasingly, some bloggers are hoping to 
get some. 
Argument number two—saying this is not a big problem—
there is an implied license.  You put it out on the Internet and 
somebody will reuse it in various ways, but you are implying that 
they can.  In the really simple syndication space, which is the mode 
of aggregating Web blogs and replaying them, this is a dominant 
argument, which says: If you put something out there on a blog 
and you put it in an XML format that lets other people re-aggregate 
it, of course you are implying that they can use it.  Now, I am not 
sure that is sustainable, but it is clearly one of the arguments. 
The last one is that you go to fair use.  You take the argument 
that says: It might be somebody else’s copyright―of course it is; 
in digital space it is no different than in the offline space―but then 
fair use exempts all of these mash-ups. 
But against that backdrop there is almost no licensing of user-
generated content.  The only licensing that goes on is Creative 
Commons licenses.58  These are licenses that are created by a 
nonprofit organization that people put onto their user-generated 
content.  There are 140 million objects with Creative Commons 
licenses on them.  But these are licenses that are used on only a 
small fraction of what is out there in the user-generated content 
space. 
[Slide]  This is presenting issues.  If I had access to the 
Internet, I would click on this page and show you a post from a 
venture capitalist who invests in this space.  One of the things that 
many of the people putting capital into Web 2.0 are concerned 
about is that billions of dollars are going into building this layer of 
technologies, but it is on sand, and there is a copyright problem 
 
 58 See Creative Commons, http://www.creativecommons.org. 
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lurking at the core of it, which are these rights problems that we 
have seen show up in YouTube.  So the Silicon Valley people, who 
we do not have to worry about―they have lots of yachts and so 
forth―are putting money into an emerging and important space, 
trying to reach these digital natives, but they are going to lose it all 
because there is going to be a copyright train wreck at the end of it. 
There is also, of course, the issue that copyright links up in this 
context frequently to trademark―people are inventing things that 
have trademarks. 
But also, importantly, privacy.  Go back to that digital identity 
concern, which is if you are wrapping into your user-generated 
creation, you might well in fact be taking what is increasingly the 
digital identity of people who initially posted it, but without any 
either compensation or licensing. 
[Slide]  So takeaways of this rapid tour through the world of 
digital natives: 
The version of the Web that is called Web 2.0, or user-
generated media and so forth, is about creativity at the edges.  
Stipulate that lots and lots of people are creating Web blogs and so 
forth―65 million by one count, 35 million in China, and growing 
very quickly around the world.  So there is lots to be happy about 
in the user-generated content space. 
But here are some problems. 
One problem is it is complicated for traditional media 
companies, traditional authors and creators, to participate in this 
because there is not a whole lot of a sense of “Okay, if I go out into 
this wild world of user-generated content and try to bring it into, 
say, thewashingtonpost.com, which they do very effectively,59 do 
you pay the author whose stuff you brought in?  If you are a large 
media company that is trying to get hip to what people are saying 
and to build it into the videos and so forth that you are posting on 
the Web, do you go clear those rights?  How do you participate in 
 
 59 Registered users of thewashingtonpost.com can submit comments on site articles, blogs, 
and reviews. See washingtonpost.com Discussion Guidelines, http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-srv/liveonline/delphi/delphirules.htm.  In addition, The Washington Post’s 
rewards program awards points for posting user content online.  See The Washington Post 
PostPoints, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/registration/postpoints/marketing.html. 
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this world, which is extremely informal, and with creative 
comments licenses, at best?” 
One of the key ways that this content is shared is through 
syndication.  Again, sort of a longer story, but there are 
technologies, RSS60 being the key one, that have the ability to 
syndicate little bits of content across the Web and then re-
aggregate them.  I think there is a looming crisis in the mode of 
syndication because of the lack of clarity that is there. 
I think substantially fair use is a part of the answer here.  It is 
critically important that I not suggest that fair use ought to be 
curtailed or that fair use is insufficient in its ability to protect much 
of this use.  But I do not think it does solve this extremely informal 
process of reusing and creating entirely. 
So what are some answers to it? 
One is to say if everybody used a Creative Commons license, 
or some other license, when they were a user, creating one of these 
millions and millions and millions of digital things, and then you 
were to have a system where we all recognize those rights and 
reuse them accordingly—maybe technology in a DRM-style way, 
in fact, would recognize these licenses and allow you to recreate 
them or not—that is one possibility. 
Perhaps you could also put a layer on top of it.  Imagine the 
Copyright Clearance Center, but one that, in fact, is done for user-
generated content in a micro-payment way. 
Another possibility that some scholars have suggested in this 
zone is, of course, compulsory licensing, which is to say could we 
set up a system for all this informal stuff that is on the Web, 
consider it compulsorily licensed out to the world?  How would 
you manage the payment?  I think that is a complicated issue. 
Another variant of that could be, of course, that you just clear 
all of this stuff to be in some sort of a public domain.  I think that 
is relatively farfetched. 
Another example would be one that Laura and others have 
worked on extensively, which is what are the best practices here 
 
 60 Really Simple Syndication, a file format for web feeds. 
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for doing it, and try to get a better user understanding of what, in 
fact, are the best practices for reusing somebody else’s content, 
and, through education and better understanding, hope that that, in 
fact, may help to solve the problem. 
With forty-five seconds left here, I might cede, but say that fair 
use is hugely helpful in this crisis, may in fact help avert much of 
it, but may not be the entire answer. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thank you. 
Last, Hugh Hansen. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: John, that was a trade secret, by the 
way. 
MR. PALFREY: Sorry about that.  It is on the record.  It will 
be in the Journal. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes, it will be in the Journal. 
MR. PALFREY: They will put the “brilliant” part in there too, 
though, I think. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you.  Well, I usually insert 
that anyway. 
We are addressing the role of  fair use.61  To understand that 
role, I think we have to examine what role copyright plays. 
It is common to say that copyright is a monopoly or limited 
monopoly.  Paul Aiken is, of course, right to challenge that 
language.  But I would not even concede that it is a weak 
monopoly.  A monopoly is driven by market share and entails the 
ability to restrict output or control prices.62  Some say that it is a 
“legal monopoly,” distinguishing it from an economic monopoly.   
I do not understand this use of “monopoly” other than to avoid 
saying that copyright is a property right. 
 
 61 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 62 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (definition of “monopoly”).  The legal 
protection that copyright law provides does not accomplish anything in the market place 
other than the prevention of copying.  Copyright is a nothing more than a property right, 
and a limited property right at that. 
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Some say that copyright law is a liability or a regulatory 
scheme in an effort, I assume, to avoid the consequences of having 
to defend the taking someone else’s property.  But, the courts and 
Congress have consistently treated copyright as property—a 
bundle of rights protecting some thing or a “res,” to use the Latin. 
To understand what courts and Congress have done it is helpful 
to look at Locke and his so-called labor theory of property: Under 
that theory, as we all know, one’s effort creates a natural law 
property right.63  Locke is not in fashion today to say the least.  He 
is viewed as too extreme.  But, Locke did recognize limits to the 
theory.  If there is not enough raw material around, effort with 
regard to the limited raw material does not give any one person a 
property right.  This recognition of the need in certain 
circumstances  to share or limit property interests also takes place 
in copyright law.  We see it with regard to, inter alia, the idea-
expresson dichotomy, the exceptions to bundle of rights contained 
in § 106, and, of course, fair use.  This balancing to date, however, 
has normally occurred with the thumb down on the property side 
of the scale. 
If you do not think of copyright in the above-stated property 
sense, you are going to scratch your head and wonder why we get 
the results we get both in Congress and the courts.  It might be that 
in the future this approach will change to something closer to what 
the Copy Left desire and advocate.  But right now, anyway, most 
courts, jurors and the legislatures, treat copyright as it is a property 
right with some limited balancing. 
So with the current role of copyright in mind, what role does 
fair use have?  Historically, it has been a method to sort out the 
equities when the defendant’s use does not threaten the mainstream 
revenue stream of the copyright owner. It focuses on a particular 
copyright owner and a particular user or copier.  It is an ad hoc or 
micro approach.  As Justice Souter stated in Acuff-Rose, the “task 
is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the 
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”64  Even the 
minimalist bright-line rule that fair use is an affirmative defense, 
 
 63 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ch. V (1690). 
64  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
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while often stated in the doctrinal introduction in the beginning of 
an opinon, is ignored in the reasoning that follows later.  Likewise 
the Copy Left view of fair use as a right carries no weight to date 
in courts’ very ad hoc determinations. 
John Palfrey earlier walked us through alternatives to fair use 
that might be coming with regard to specific factual scenarios.  I 
agree with John that we must find a way to allow user-generated 
creativity to flourish and to make it widely available.  Actually, I 
think John was quite balanced in his appraisal and suggestions.  He 
invariably is.  Wherever people put the the Berkman Center on the 
Copyright-Copy Left spectrum, John is too balanced and 
reasonable to be considered hard-core Copy Left. 
In short, fair use is best viewed historically as a tool on a case 
by case basis to decide in close cases who should win.  Courts have 
been careful to produce no sweeping generalizations.  Nor do 
courts look to previous results in their analysis.  While a court 
might cite doctrinal statements on fair use from past cases, the 
particular applications of the doctrine cited as applied to the facts 
in those past cases are neither analyzed nor applied to produce the 
results in the current case.  It is similar in that regard to 
determining “substantial similarity” or “likelihood of confusion” in 
trademark cases.  Courts  have desired flexibility in intellectual 
property cases, and these doctrines have been created to provide 
that flexibility. 
Nevertheless, there are some patterns one can look to in 
determining whether there is a fair use or not.  Of the four fair use 
factors, the second (“the nature of the copyrighted work”) plays no 
real part today.  The third factor (“amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”) was 
once important but has much less impact since the reprography 
revolution.  The first factor (“the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes”) is important as it looks at the 
conduct of the defendant.  Not much weight is placed on whether 
or not the work is commercial and if the work is nonprofit, it does 
not matter much whether it is for educational purposes or not.  
There is still some weight given to how much of the defendant’s 
work consists of simply copying the plaintiff’s work.  What 
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percentage of the defendant’s work was simply copied from the 
plaintiff’s?  That question still has some importance today.  Courts 
often mistakenly place this analysis into the third factor, which is 
designed to focus only on what percentage of the plaintiff’s work 
was taken, not how it was used.65  Also, transformative uses come 
into play here. 
The fourth factor (“the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work”)66 is the most 
important.67  Justice Souter stated in Acuff-Rose “[m]arket harm is 
a matter of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not 
only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of 
the showing on the other factors.”68  I think the reality is that a 
demonstration of harm makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to 
find fair use, as Souter had indicated earlier in the opinion in Acuff-
Rose.69  Where there is only potential harm to a market, fair use 
might have a chance if the first factor is strong in defendant’s 
favor, but where there is demonstrated actual harm, there is 
currently no chance.  This, of course, is consistent with a property 
right analysis. 
Even if fair use were just more sophisticated way to judge who 
is the good guy or bad guy, it clearly demonstrates that defendants 
do not always lose.  In fact, sometimes it is so clear that a 
defendant should prevail that courts do not even take the time to go 
through a fair use analysis and simply use the de minimis doctrine.  
Another indication of the courts’ increasing view that plaintiffs’ 
copyright actions might be without merit is the expanded use of 
summary judgment for defendants.  This is in the face of strong 
language by Judge Jerome Frank in Arnstein v. Porter back in 
1946 that summary judgment in a copyright case is not generally 
appropriate because of the ability of plaintiff’s case to develop at 
trial with cross-examination of the defendant, etc.  Frank, with 
 
 65 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 66 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
 67 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) 
(noting that the “last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use”). 
 68 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 591 n.21 (1994). 
 69 Id. at 591 (defendant “would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating 
fair use without favorable evidence about relevant markets”). 
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Judge Learned Hand concurring, strongly reaffirmed Second 
Circuit language that summary judgment should not be granted 
where “there is the slightest doubt about the facts.”70  Courts today, 
particularly the Second Circuit, recognizing the waste of judicial 
resources and unfairness to defendants today follow the more 
sympathetic view of summary judgment of Judge Clark’s in 
dissent in that case.71 
So where is fair use going in the future?  I am firm believer in 
the value of copyright but also in the need for proper fair use 
analysis.  To make sure fair use has a role to play at three things 
are necessary: (1) policy not doctrine controls cases; (2) users need 
to resist copyright industries’ culture of requiring licenses for 
every use including fair uses; and (3) resources need to be made 
available to users to resist that culture wherever it is found. 
1) Policy, Not Doctrine, Controls Cases 
I need not to go into a whole legal realist spiel here.  It is 
enough to remember that fair use was made out of whole cloth by 
the courts beginning with Justice Story in Folsom.72  Fair use is 
simply a doctrinal vehicle for courts to do what they want in a 
particular case.  By emphasizing the ad hoc nature of fair use 
courts have demonstrated their lack of concern for precedents.  But 
even if that were not the case, courts have written opinions that 
would not bind them to any particular result in the future.  This is 
true, for instance, of Justice Souter’s opinion in Acuff-Rose which 
makes comments on both sides of each fair use issue it analyzes.  It 
is also true of his opinion in Grokster.  When you take into account 
all the issues that have been reserved and the dicta, the Court is 
pretty much free to do anything it wants in the next P2P case.  
Despite my best efforts, many people thought that the result in 
Grokster was going to be controlled by Sony.  (Many of them owe 
 
 70 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir 1946). 
 71 Id. at 480 (copyright “suits are not excepted from F.R. 56; and often that seems the 
most useful and direct procedure”).  See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 256–57 (1986) (rejecting an argument that “defendant should seldom if ever be 
granted summary judgment” and requiring that “plaintiff must present affirmative 
evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion of summary judgment”). 
 72 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841). 
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me dinner now, by the way.)  Justice Scalia during the oral 
argument in Grokster commented to Grokster’s attorney, “[t]his 
Court is certainly not going to decide this case on the basis of stare 
decisis, you know, whatever else is true.”73  I imagine Grokster’s 
attorney was taken aback by that statement. 
MR. PALFREY: Is it a joke? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: No, he was serious. 
And as David Carson said, the actual words of § 107 have not 
really controlled outcomes.74  So doctrine by way of precedents or 
statutory language is not controlling.  The key, therefore, is to 
make convincing policy arguments as to what should be done 
without forgetting the basic importance of gut instinct, good 
guy/bad guy conclusions.  So do not look at the Supreme Court’s 
words, most of which were written by clerks and not by the 
Justices themselves, in any case, or statutory language.  Do not 
parse their opinions or those of any other courts as if they came 
down like the Ten Commandments, because the courts are not 
going to do that. 
So what is a concrete example of what should be done in a fair 
use case?  Let’s take the real world example of the Google book 
library project.75  Google needs to emphasize its opt-out provision 
and not back away from it in litigation.  Critics of the book project 
say that copyright has never embraced an opt-out approach.  My 
answer is, “So what?”  An incredible project that perhaps only 
Google could attempt with great public benefit will be thwarted 
because publishers insist that Google say, “Pretty please, may I?”  
Critics say that it will set a bad precedent.  Well, as we  
have discussed fair use is ad hoc and no court need allow opt-outs 
in other cases based upon the result in this case.  The facts in  
Google make it sui generis ab initio.  But Google might go  
beyond that and argue that opt-out, at least in some  
 
 
 73 Transcript of Record at 41, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 480). 
 74 See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (Carson comments). 
 75 For a full description of the Google Book Project, see Melanie Costantino, Note, 
Fairly Used: Why Google’s Book Project Should Prevail under the Fair Use Defense, 
17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 235 (2006). 
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circumstances, in not a bad thing but sometimes can easily and 
properly balance the interests of those involved.  I have been told 
by lawyers on Google side that the opt-out provision is “nice” but 
not legally relevant in a fair use analysis.  That type of statement 
make me, a legal realist, cringe.  Everything is relevant in all cases 
if it can influence the court, especially in the judge-made rule-of-
reason, fair use.  Moreover, there is doctrine right on point.  Opt-
out is part of the first factor, “the nature and character of 
[defendant’s] use of [plaintiff’s work].” 
What about the good guy/bad guy analysis? 
This case reeks of good guy/bad guy arguments.  For the 
publishers, Google is the capitalist spawn of satan, not caring about 
anyone or the law, running roughshod over publishers who scratch 
out a living working for the public good.  In fact, Google better 
watch how it acts and is perceived.  Whatever the merits of its 
copyright law arguments, if courts buy into even some of this 
characterization, it will make it much harder if not impossible to 
win. 
What can Google do on the factual aspects of the good guy/bad 
guy issue?  First, do not think it is irrelevant to the case.  Second, 
try hard to demonstrate it is a good copyright citizen in other 
contexts.  For instance, do not just announce a licensing program 
for YouTube, but be reasonable and try hard to make it happen.  
Try donating to charitable organizations rather than just looking 
for nonprofit investment opportunities.  Sponsoring the Fordham 
Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & 
Policy would be a very good start. 
What can Google do with policy/legal analyses concerning the 
claim that it is a bad guy?  It should, while denying the factual 
truth of the allegations, of course, make use of the bad guy 
characterizations as a reflection on the merits of the case.  Google 
is being singled out not because of the copyright merits, but 
because of publishers views about Google and perhaps free market 
capitalism.  What the publishers fear is changes in the status quo 
over which they have no control.  (Not an unusual human 
perspective.)  But rather than opt out to gain control or find other 
ways to deal with those fears, they choose instead to kill a project 
that will help many if not all in their industry: publishers and 
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authors alike; not to mention the public.  Publishers are interested 
in their own power, which frankly has been misused to the 
disadvantage of many authors over the years.  That they are not 
acting upon the copyright merits is illustrated by their failure to sue 
the libraries involved in the Google book project, without whom 
the project would fail.  Why do they not sue them?  Because the 
libraries are good guys.  If the Library of Congress had come up 
with this project, there would have been praise not a lawsuit.  The 
public is going to lose a wonderful project because the publishers 
are going after an outsider who is actually helping them but who 
has not shown proper respect and deference, and who frightens 
them. 
On the publishers’ side, they could do worse than address what 
really frightens them, and others as well.  Google, I think, frightens 
people because it is not subject to the same constraints as other 
people and organizations.  This is true in part because of its 
overwhelming market success, resulting commercial power, 
continuing ability to innovate and succeed, lack of concern for the 
views of others or need to consider the views of others, and the 
digital zeitgeist, religion, or philosophy it embraces.  In a sentence, 
Google’s philosophy might be described as “today the book 
project, tomorrow the world.” 
Back to Google’s arguments.  What about arguments 
concerning the very important fair use fourth factor: harm to 
markets and potential markets?76  The claim that the book project 
will harm the publishers seems like a manufactured argument.  It is 
not clear how Google’s project will hurt the publishers other than 
they will not get royalties from Google’s use.  But lack of royalties 
from fair use claimants is true with regard to every fair use claim. 
What about harm to the publishers’ competing databases?  That 
also seems contrived.  The reality is that there will be no 
competing databases.  All other book databases will be niche 
submarkets that should be helped by Google’s all inclusive 
database market.  Moreover, if there is harm, all they have to do to 
stop it is to write a letter to Google opting out.  If writing a letter is 
too much effort, there cannot be much harm. 
 
76 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000). 
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Most of the above analysis and arguments are non-doctrinal.  It 
is the non-doctrinal policy and good guy/bad guy arguments, 
however, that convince or at least influence courts.  If  you think 
doctrine and stare decisis control, speak with Justice Scalia.  Fair 
use advocates and opponents need to make these types of 
arguments.  If you stick to doctrine, the Courts will go on by 
themselves to figure out the correct policies, or worse, will do so 
with the help of your opponents. 
2) User Must Resist Copyright Industries’ Culture of Requiring 
Licenses for Every Use Including Fair Uses 
The first problem with this culture is that the industry is 
overreaching and claiming protection where it does not exist.  
Laura Quilter has demonstrated this to be the case as well in the 
DMCA context.77  The second problem is that in the commercial 
context it produces people who pay fees rather than fighting in 
court to demonstrate fair use.  This is a perfectly reasonable 
position for businesses as it is much easier and cheaper to pay than 
to former.  Nevertheless, it needs to be resisted because when 
courts find an industry culture of payments, they will more easily 
conclude that defendants’ non-authorized uses cause economic 
harm, the lack of customary fees for use.  I think this influenced 
Judge Newman in Ringgold, a case, if fees had not been paid to the 
plaintiff for the same types of use, that probably would have gone 
the other way.78  It also influenced Justice O’Connor’s definition 
of commercial use in Harper & Row.79 
3) Resources Need to Be Made Available to Users to Resist 
Industry Cultures of Requiring Licenses for All Uses Including 
Fair Use 
We need resources to be made available to enable users to 
resist these demands.  Perhaps one or two test litigations on behalf 
of documentary filmmakers, for instance, would do the trick. 
 
 77 See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (Quilter comments). 
 78 Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 79 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 606 (1985). 
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I think fair use, the law, is okay for the most part, and I think it 
can work.  The problem is that people cannot avail themselves of 
its protection. 
What did we do when people could not afford to take 
advantage of criminal defenses or protections such as the Fourth 
Amendment?  We provided them with lawyers.  We also provided 
lawyers in civil contexts.  We have to think about supplying 
lawyers for people stuck in a user position in which they have a 
legitimate fair use defense but cannot afford to litigate it. 
Now Fordham is thinking of having an IP clinic.  It costs a lot 
of money.  I am going to ask you to contribute at the end of this 
session.  In fact, the doors are locked, so don’t try to escape. 
The key, I do not think, is changing the law.  I think the key is 
giving economic power to the other side so the full aspects of fair 
use can be litigated. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thank you.  As always, the diamond 
in the crown of Fordham Law School. 
Before we actually start―and we have a fair amount of time to 
talk about questions―I just want to ask the panelists whether they 
want to take a minute or so to respond to some of the things that 
have been said, and then we will go directly to questions.  Does 
anyone want to respond? 
MS. QUILTER: I will jump in with a quick comment. 
The informality that John was discussing, which may be 
leading us to a copyright train wreck, I actually want to hold that 
out as a positive, because it has enabled a tremendous amount of 
free expression.  People really do not want to have to go see a 
lawyer; they do not want to have to think about licensing; they 
really just want to put their content out in the world, they really 
want to communicate, they really want to talk and share 
information.  That has created the Internet.  The Internet was not 
created by a bunch of lawyers who were saying, “Well, before you 
start posting this, you really want to make sure you’ve got your IP 
rights worked out,” and da da da. 
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I think it is actually proving to be a tremendous boon for 
creators in every walk of life, including new creators who we never 
envisioned before.  There are definitely a lot of problems as we are 
working our way through that, and adjustments as people are 
negotiating values from one media and trying to work out how 
they exchange information in the other media. 
But while we are looking at the potential train wrecks, I would 
actually like to put in a voice for informality and not lawyering-up 
in every aspect of life.  I think that is a positive, affirmative value.  
To the extent that fair use helps us keep things informal and 
flexible and loose, then I think that is a really useful role for fair 
use.  If we do not have fair use to do it, maybe de minimis, maybe 
something else.  But I think it is an incredibly valuable thing. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I agree. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Anyone else? 
MR. AIKEN: I would like to comment on a couple things. 
Regarding the Web 2.0 issues that John brought up,80 a lot of 
this can be handled through implied license.  An implied license is 
how most search engines work.  When you put something on the 
Internet and you know there are search engines out there and you 
do not put the blocking tag on, there is, in my view, an implied 
license to make it available in these search engines.  I think that 
has a big role. 
I think also the Creative Commons license is a great thing.  As 
long as people are fully aware of what rights they are giving up 
and they realize it is a real license, in many cases irrevocable, as 
long as they know what they are doing, it’s a powerful tool and 
should be used by people who are interested in participating in 
various mash-ups and collages online. 
Regarding Professor Hansen’s talk,81 I would agree with a lot 
of what he said, with one big exception.  I think that fair use 
basically works.  The problem is there often are not enough legal 
resources on the side of the creator who wants to make fair use. 
 
 80 See supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text (Palfrey comments). 
 81 See supra notes 61–79 and accompanying text (Hansen comments). 
PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807 5/8/2007  1:04:06 PM 
2007 COPYRIGHT PANEL: FAIR USE 1055 
Authors all the time want to make fair use of things.  They 
come to our offices asking what is allowed, what is permitted.  All 
we can tell them is what the industry practice is and say, “This is 
no guarantee.  You will have to give it your best shot and we will 
stand behind you the best way we can if this is ever litigated.”  But 
we are a nonprofit, and there are limits to how much we can stand 
behind someone. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Great, thank you. 
Let’s actually take a few questions.  We have microphones in 
the back.  If you would just identify yourself before you ask.  
Otherwise I will start calling on people. 
QUESTION: Hi.  Susan Scafidi, visiting here at Fordham Law 
School and ordinarily at SMU in Dallas.82 
I wanted to thank the panel.  It was fabulous. 
I would like to turn the panel’s attention a little bit back to the 
question or the concern that Laura raised, the concern about cease-
and-desist letters being overused, essentially.  I have two 
questions. 
The micro question, Laura, is one of methodology.  That is to 
say, David and Hugh both pointed out that it is really tough to 
determine whether or not something is fair use, and we see that 
flip-flopping in the courts.83  So when we have twenty-one percent 
or thirty percent of cases that you all determine are either weak 
copyright cases, weak infringement cases, or strong fair use 
defenses,84 how exactly do you go about determining that, given 
the uncertainty of the doctrine?  I know you have a wonderful 
methodology.  I would just like to hear it unpacked a little bit 
more. 
The meta question, again going to the panel, is how to solve 
this.  It is frightening to get a cease-and-desist letter.  I am 
certainly not a digital native.  I speak with an accent.  I am terrified 
 
 82 See Justin Hughes et. al, Panel II: That’s a Fine Chablis You’re Not Drinking: The 
Proper Place for Geographical Indications in Trademark Law, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 933 (2007) (Susan Scafidi presentation). 
 83 See supra notes 32–49 and accompanying text (Carson comments); supra notes 61–
79 and accompanying text (Hansen comments). 
 84 See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (Quilter comments). 
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when I get them.  I usually bare my teeth and send back a nasty 
letter.  I have always, in the few cases it has been, gotten an “Oh 
sorry, professor”―in one case, exactly those two words.  But it is 
still nerve-wracking to get that. 
So how do you solve it, and especially given David’s point that 
other countries do have clearer systems, do have the equivalent of 
fair use codified, ordinarily do it in a more narrow fashion, and the 
negotiation process that leads to codifying anything tends to favor 
those who do not favor broad fair use conceptions?85  So I will 
leave it there for the panel to answer. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Susan, what have you been doing 
that you are getting cease-and-desist letters? 
QUESTIONER [Professor Scafidi]: I will say nothing. 
MS. QUILTER: Okay.  Well, I will jump in very quickly on 
the methodology.  The first question was, what was the 
methodology by which we determined fair use or substantive 
problems with the underlying claim, those kinds of questions. 
There were actually two studies.86  I cannot speak as intimately 
to the first study, although my colleague did it.  But they basically 
broke it down into five categories, which included a strong 
underlying rights claim, whether it be trademark or copyright; a 
weak underlying rights claim; a strong fair use or free expression 
defense; a pretty good fair use or free expression defense; and an 
ambiguous, not very well known.  Within those, they basically just 
went through the straightforward analyses that are applicable in 
trademark and in fair use and looked at whether there was a market 
effect, whether the work was significantly transformative.  For 
them, if there was a competitor involved, they considered that to be 
a market effect, and so against fair use.  They weighed 
transformative very high.  They looked at questions in terms of the 
underlying claim. 
They looked at questions of copyrightability of subject matter, 
which turns out to be a big problem, because people are confused 
about what copyrights cover, as you guys have pointed out.  I mean 
 
 85 See supra notes 32–49 and accompanying text (Carson comments). 
 86 See supra note 24. 
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they do not cover ideas; they do not cover necessarily very short 
phrases or titles.87  So people get really confused about what 
copyright covers and they make a lot of very broad claims. 
In our study, we also had to deal with the fair use analysis and 
basically go through that.  For all of these things, we tried to take a 
fairly conservative approach, because you really do not want 
someone to go back and look at that and say, “What are you 
talking about?” and really start attacking our data that way. 
But I think it is reasonable actually to say twenty to thirty 
percent, because people just dash these letters and these notices 
off.  It is very easy for them to do that.  So, it is not really 
surprising to me that they are doing that. 
In fact, I am not sure that it is necessarily a big problem in the 
§ 512 context if there is a remedy to deal with it, if people are 
aware of their counter-notice rights and have some way to respond 
to it effectively, or if there is a good judicial remedy.  The problem 
with the § 512 process is that there really is no good judicial 
remedy.88  The standard for going into court and saying, “Well, 
they did this and they were trying to intimidate me” is incredibly 
high.  It has to be an intentional misrepresentation,89 which is not 
going to get at the blustery language that many lawyers use when 
they are trying to get someone to remove something that affronts 
them. 
It is not going to get at people’s just honest confusion about the 
fact that “you are posting this photograph of my daughter online 
and that really upsets me.  But actually you are the photographer 
and you are the copyright holder, so I really cannot send a DMCA 
notice after you, but you are violating my privacy rights.”  So 
people are misusing the law to get at all these very legitimate 
interests, and that is not going to be taken care of in any way. 
I feel that it actually ends up giving short shrift to the rights 
that we need to be addressing.  I mean there are lots of privacy 
 
 87 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see also Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 
266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1959) (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. 46, 
(1958)). 
 88 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2000). 
 89 Id. § 512(f). 
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rights that we should be addressing and dealing with, and we are 
not, because people are just dashing off § 512 notices. 
That is a quick answer for the methodology―basically you just 
have to kind of go through fair use analyses.  I think both studies 
privileged transformative uses and looked at copyrightable subject 
matter and took a fairly strict line in terms of competition, 
competitive commercial uses. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: The second question, I think, turns 
more on the question of normative approaches to cease-and-desist 
letters, which is: Is it better to move towards a world where we 
have more enumeration of different rights, or do we want to retain 
the kind of flexibility and the malleability that fair use has at its 
core. 
David, did you want to answer? 
MR. CARSON: I am not sure if I am going to answer that 
question specifically.  My first response would be “have a 
backbone.” 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Have a what? 
MR. CARSON: A backbone, when you get one of those things.  
I have been in government since 1997, so I really have not had to 
deal with cease-and-desist letters. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: It is easy for you to say, then, isn’t 
it? 
MR. CARSON: It is easier for me to say.  But I have received 
plenty of them as counsel for corporate clients back in the mostly 
pre-Internet age.  I will grant the volume, I am sure, is much 
different now, and just the magnitude of it alters the nature of the 
problem. 
But I would say, going back many, many years now, easily 
fifty percent of the cease-and-desist letters I saw were just plain 
frivolous.  Let’s face it, if there is anything almost as bad as a 
blatant infringer it is an overzealous copyright owner.  But the fact 
of the matter is that copyright owners feel overly protective of their 
works and of their rights, and if they think they’ve got a leg to 
stand on, and often if they don’t think they have a leg to stand on, 
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they are going to assert infringement because they know a lawyer’s 
letter is enough to scare most people off. 
So, in principle, the answer is do not be scared by it.  In 
principle, the answer is find yourself someone who knows 
copyright law, a copyright lawyer who knows copyright law, and 
let them write a nasty letter back.  My experience tells me that 
when that nasty letter does go back, it goes away. 
Now, that’s easy to say, harder to do.  Maybe part of the 
answer to that is contribute to Hugh’s clinic,90 because we all know 
access to legal resources is incredibly difficult.  When I was in 
private practice, I knew that if I ever got in trouble and got sued, I 
could not afford myself.  And that is true of most people. 
So it is a big problem.  You do need to think hard about ways 
to give the right resources to people who find themselves in the 
situation―both authors who have claims who cannot afford to 
present them, and people who find themselves at the receiving end 
of one of these letters and have no one to turn to and no one to 
speak for them. 
Last year, in the context of the orphan works study that the 
Copyright Office did and the legislative proposal, which went 
fairly far through Congress, one of the issues that was raised by 
authors, photographers, and so on was: Look, you are whittling 
away at our rights at a time when we cannot enforce the rights we 
have because we cannot afford to play the game of litigation in the 
federal courts. 
There were proposals, which Congress started thinking about, 
and I think will continue to think about, of alternative means for 
copyright owners to assert small claims that do not get them 
sucked into the federal judicial system, where if your claim is not 
worth tens and tens and tens of thousands of dollars at a minimum, 
it is just not worth pursuing it. 
We heard some things―not enough, but some complaints―by 
people on the other side: “I got a cease-and-desist letter;” “I got 
sued for copyright infringement”; “I did not think I was doing 
 
 90 See supra notes 61–79 and accompanying text (Hansen comments). 
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anything wrong, but I had to buckle under because I could not 
afford a lawyer.” 
Thought needs to be given to how you give people the means 
of access to resources to defend themselves as well.  We need to 
think hard about alternative fora, alternative means, where you can 
perhaps even force some of these claims, those below a certain 
value anyway, into another forum where it is easier to find a 
resolution. 
The law is fine.  It is the resources basically and what people 
do with the law that’s the problem. 
MS. QUILTER: Let me just add on to that.  I would actually 
tinker with the law.  I think the law is not entirely fine. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Hold on, hold on.  John hasn’t 
spoken yet. 
MR. PALFREY: That’s okay, Hugh.  I cede. 
MS. QUILTER: Okay.  Just really quickly to add on, I think 
that educating consumers and getting consumers resources to deal 
with this will help build a backbone.  We are also going to try to 
work on developing best practices for OSPs so that they know to 
educate consumers when they get that information.  I will leave it 
at that. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: John? 
MR. PALFREY: I would just empathize slightly and say, in 
fact, go as far as the § 512(f) provision more frequently.  I think 
that one of the matters―we were one of many clinics defending 
people―was when Diebold asserted its rights over certain 
copyrighted materials and so forth in the context of security 
concerns over voting machines91―I do not know whether people 
followed this case.  There were a bunch of Swarthmore students, 
Harvard students, and others.  The Harvard student we defended in 
this exact context was one of several.  He is now an advocate at 
EFF, as it turns out.  But some of these cases were brought to the 
court, and Diebold was found to be liable and having overreached. 
 
 91 See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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So, I think that there are many more cases in which firmer 
pushback would, in fact, be better.  I think that may go to Hugh’s 
point, which is the more that we can get the law elucidated by 
virtue of bringing cases that do define these limits in such a way 
and take advantage of what is fully there,92 I think that is a huge 
part of the answer. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: One other thing.  James Boyle down 
at Duke, with Jennifer Jenkins and Keith Aoki, produced this 
cartoon book of what documentary filmmakers can and cannot 
do.93  Best practices guides like this give users a lot of guidance 
and support.  That is a tremendous value.  If we could do that in 
more industries, it gives the moral backbone to somebody to resist 
and say, “I have this on my side.” 
I think in most of these cases—I think David is right—
overreaching copyright industry representatives will ultimately 
back down.94  I am not sure when they will back down. 
And that is important because they can kill a project if you 
cannot initially clear the rights either to the satisfaction of 
insurance company to obtain backers, just because of that letter.  
So, you really need, not just backbone, but you need something 
more on your side. 
MR. PALFREY: Comic books. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay, great. 
Next question? 
QUESTION: My name is Devrim Elci.  I am a second-year law 
student here at Fordham, so obviously I am no expert on copyright.  
But I notice you guys were talking about educating people as to the 
effects of the counter-notice letters. 
You mentioned, Professor Hansen, that summary judgment is 
becoming more common in this context.95  I am wondering―we 
 
 92 See supra notes 61–79 and accompanying text (Hansen comments). 
 93 James Boyle, Jennifer Jenkins & Keith Aoki, BOUND BY LAW (Duke Center for the 
Study of the Public Domain 2006), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/comics/ 
zoomcomic.html. 
 94 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (Carson comments). 
 95 See supra notes 61–79 and accompanying text (Hansen comments). 
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have heard things in places like medical malpractice, the idea of 
setting up a separate sort of expert advisory panel that filters 
through frivolous claims.  Are there rationales for or against 
something like that in the copyright context, where you get so 
many of these claims that are frivolous, and maybe we ought to 
have somebody whose only job is to get rid of them? 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: The question is: Do we want some 
sort of administrative kind of ad-hoc agency that is specially 
charged― 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Elci]: To clarify or define, so that we cut 
down on the amount of overreaching. 
MR. CARSON: If you gave us the resources, we would love to 
do it. 
When I was in private practice, most of my time was spent 
defending copyrights, and most of the cases were prime for 
summary judgment because they were simply silly.  People made 
outrageous claims of copyright infringement.  So, I am 
preconditioned to look at most copyright infringement claims with 
a healthy skepticism, apart from cases where people are actually 
taking an entire work and redistributing it or something, which is a 
whole different situation. 
I do not know about the volume, whether the volume of 
specious claims is so high―although, from Laura’s study, perhaps 
it is96―where you really need to set up a mechanism like that.  But 
it certainly is something that has occurred to me, that if there was 
some way to screen those out, whether it is an administrative 
mechanism or something else, it would be a great idea.  For too 
many claims, just to get to summary judgment is going to cost you 
tens of thousands of dollars.  Who can afford that? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Well, first of all, you might have a 
Seventh Amendment problem if you have screening out of things 
before they are allowed to bring it.97  What you might do is add 
$10 to the registration fee and create a fund. 
 
 96 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (Quilter Comments). 
 97 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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MR. CARSON: Everybody liked it when we increased the fee 
this year, so that is a great idea. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Who is “they?” 
MR. CARSON: Everyone. 
MR. AIKEN: Authors are really big fans of registration fees. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: And did you care one whit?  No.  So 
increase it $10 more for a good cause and create a fund.  Maybe 
some of that money can go to people who cannot afford to litigate.  
At least try it.  You know, you are big on this fighting back.  Let’s 
see some action. 
MR. CARSON: All right.  How about a fee shifting?  We’ve 
got a fee-shifting provision right now which gives the court 
discretion.  I am thinking out loud here.  How about we have some 
kind of mechanism where it is prescreened by some agency, expert 
panel, whatever?  If that panel says it is not a meritorious claim 
and it proceeds to court, unless you win as the plaintiff in court, 
you do pay the attorney’s fees; and it is full attorney’s fees, the 
court has no discretion.  That is not bad.  It may not be enough, but 
it is a step in the right direction. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: If you win. 
MR. CARSON: I am the defendant.  The expert said I should 
not even be sued.  The plaintiff takes me to court anyway.  
Somehow I find the means to fight, maybe because I’ve got a 
lawyer who is convinced it is a frivolous claim, knowing that if at 
the end of the day if the court agrees that it should never have been 
brought, I get every dime I spent and then some.  Not a bad idea. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That’s not bad. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Well, we heard it here first. 
Let’s actually go on to another question.  Go ahead. 
QUESTION: Thank you. William Tennant, Fordham LL.M. 
student. 
My question is to the entire panel.  Would you address the 
intersection of contract law with this fair use?  Particularly, 
couldn’t a Web site put up something about arbitration or 
something to maybe contract away liability, in a sense? 
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PROFESSOR KATYAL: A question about contract interfaces 
with copyright and its impact on fair use. 
MS. QUILTER: Well, I guess there are several pieces to that.  
One is Web sites are putting up things like this all the time when 
they are doing creative comments licensing or they are doing 
licensing agreements, so they are just sort of unilaterally licensing 
out material under particular terms. 
The second thing is, in terms of―I am not quite sure I am 
envisioning what you are proposing, but something along the lines 
of, say, some sort of click-wrap, “click here to agree that if you 
read my content you will subject yourselves to arbitration in the 
state of Utah”―I would personally find that problematic from a 
free expression point of view.  I think I am going to let it go to my 
other panelists. 
MR. PALFREY: Just on that narrow point, if that were where 
you were going―no, not that way.  All right.  I won’t go that way 
then.  There happens to be case law on that. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay.  Another question? 
QUESTION: I am Joe Teague.  I am a student here at 
Fordham. 
Mr. Palfrey, you were talking about mash-ups before.98  At the 
beginning of the Symposium, there was some discussion of 
sampling, although digital sampling did not really come up.  The 
whole question of fair use with sampling versus mash-ups seemed 
to be taking different approaches.  Sampling seems to have become 
a real licensing regime but mash-ups, not.  But they seem to be sort 
of different flavors of the same sort of thing.  I am wondering why 
there are two different routes for those two similar sorts of uses. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: A question about mash-ups and 
whether or not they are treated differently under copyright law. 
John, do you want to take that? 
MR. PALFREY: Sure.  I do not think that they necessarily are, 
but I think you are hitting exactly the point that I was trying to get 
at in some ways, which is I am all for informality of the sort that 
 
 98 See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text (Palfrey comments). 
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Laura has suggested.99  I think it is great.  I am all for creative 
comments licenses and implied licenses and some of these various 
other ways of arranging for allowing somebody else to reuse your 
material in a mash-up kind of context. 
But I do not think that the law is any different in the traditional 
sampling context than in the mash-up context.  But I do think that 
somehow, in the way that people conceive what they are doing, it 
is being conceived of differently.  I guess my fear is only that, 
without elucidating best practices or without this informality 
somehow being worked into a sustainable system, as more money 
flows into the mash-up world effectively, more people have more 
capital engaged in it, and more people are making more money off 
of advertising, and search on top of it, the problem that you raise is 
going to result in a whole lot of litigation. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay, great.  Question—go ahead. 
QUESTION: Thank you.  I am a Fordham student. 
I wanted to ask Mr. Carson in particular, and the rest of the 
panel also, what you think about addressing the problem of 
copyright protection devices that preclude the possibility of your 
even reaching the point of whether or not infringement was 
frivolous. 
MR. CARSON: Can you elaborate?  I am not sure I know 
where you are going. 
QUESTIONER: What I mean is that in a digitally protected 
device you do not anymore have the opportunity to infringe, even 
if you would have a fair use defense.  Therefore, the default has 
become that there is no possibility of using it for fair use. 
MR. CARSON: I think the question has to do with copyright 
protection devices that are deployed that might prevent you from 
doing anything so that anyone could even make a determination of 
whether it is infringing or not, I gather. 
All I can tell you is what has been presented to us in the year 
2000, in the year 2003, and now this year.  The whole point of the 
rulemaking we are engaging in is to take a look at what is 
 
 99 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (Quilter comments). 
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happening currently out there in the marketplace, and determine to 
what extent access controls―and this deals only with access 
controls; things that prevent copying, and so on, are outside our 
purview―are actually being used in ways that prevent people from 
engaging in non-infringing uses. 
It is a pretty passive operation on our part.  We take in 
comments, we hold hearings so people can come testify, and they 
present to us the information they have and the arguments they 
have and so on.  The conclusions we have drawn are that, with a 
few exceptions―and those exemptions have been reflected in two 
exemptions in 2000, four exemptions in 2003; this year, if you 
follow the math, you might be able to make a prediction of how 
many exemptions there will be, but who knows. 
In any event, what we found is, by and large, we are not at a 
point yet―and we may never be, because it is not in copyright 
owners’ interests probably to get to that point; that would be my 
position―but at least we are not at a point now, with some 
exceptions, where works are put out there in ways that there is no 
way to make non-infringing uses of them. 
Now, I will give you one example that was a real easy one, 
although it is a harder one to necessarily make now.  In the year 
2000, there was all sorts of talk about movies on DVDs and how 
you cannot break through the encryption.  Well, it was real easy for 
us to say, “Yeah, but they are all out on VHS tapes too, so you 
really can make the kind of use you want to make by going to that 
alternative format.”  That’s a lot harder to say now.  How many 
movies are released on VHS anymore?  So, it gets a little different. 
But I will have to say the cases that were made to us on movies 
on DVDs, with perhaps an exception―we will have to wait and 
see―were not persuasive to us that there really is a problem, in the 
sense that people are not able to find a way to do what they feel 
they need to do, in a way that we felt was a non-infringing use in 
any event. 
So, the risk is there, and there are some areas where it has been 
a problem.  To take one example, I mentioned the one with 
filtering software that was a problem. 
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Another one was the blind, e-books for the blind―you are 
blind, you get an e-book.  E-books have a read-aloud function so 
you can listen to it.  And there is something even more 
sophisticated in the read-aloud function, called a screen reader, 
which actually, as I understand it, allows you to navigate through 
the book―take you to the table of contents, maybe even to an 
index, listen to the table of contents and say, “I want to go to 
Chapter 7; that is what I want to hear.” 
Most e-books, I think, now―we don’t really have 
statistics―have those functions enabled.  Some do not.  When they 
do not have that enabled and you are blind, you buy that e-book 
and you cannot get to it.  Why not?  No one has really been able to 
explain to us why not. 
We issued an exemption three years ago.100  One is before us 
this year again.  It does not sound to us from everything we have 
heard as though copyright owners intentionally were disabling that 
function.  It is just that they clicked the wrong box and it is out 
there, and therefore it is not enabled. 
What we concluded three years ago was that this is an area 
where the system does not seem to be working.  Whether 
intentionally or not―we made no evaluation―there was over-
protection in a way that had prevented people from engaging in 
non-infringing uses, and there is really no other satisfactory way 
for them to be able to do what they need to do.  We said, “Fine, 
that is an area where people should be able to do that.” 
So, I am not saying that the rulemaking is perfect, and I am not 
saying that the way we have done it in the past has necessarily 
been the right way.  What I guess I am saying is if you look at how 
we do it this year, you might see a change in approach.  But it is 
one way of looking at it. 
To the extent that it brings in information―which anyone can 
look at and make their own evaluation of, which may differ from 
ours―what it tells me is that so far it has not been a major 
problem, with some relatively minor exceptions. 
 
 100 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2003). 
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MR. AIKEN: I would like to address that for a minute.  I think 
there is a fundamental misconception here, that fair use somehow 
implies a right to free access.  That has never been the case.  To 
make fair use of a movie pre-digital age, someone has to have 
bought a legitimate copy.  Maybe it is a library, a university, 
whatever, but someone has to have bought the legitimate copy that 
you would the make fair use of, or someone has to have bought a 
legitimate copy of the book that you would make fair use of.  You 
cannot say, “Because there is fair use I get to look at something for 
free.” 
Also, fair use does not say that you have to make it 
technologically easy to copy something.  Just because you cannot 
make a digital copy of the DVD does not mean you cannot display 
the movie on a nice flat-panel screen, use a digital camera to 
capture that, and then put it on your own DVD or videotape.  Fair 
use does not say it has to be easy. 
For a book, it has traditionally been you have had to type in 
what you want to make fair use of to include it in your manuscript.  
No matter what protection you put on an e-book reading device, 
you can always re-key it into your own work as long as you have 
access to a legitimate copy. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: John, do you want to respond, and 
then Laura? 
MR. PALFREY: Just very, briefly.  It is a great question.  I 
think if you take the frame of it to say how often can DRM101 
trump fair use―and setting aside the § 1201 situation,102 because I 
think there are situations in which people do not have the technical 
ability to do the hacking in order to exercise this fair use―there is 
a policy argument as to whether or not you should be able to do 
that. 
But I think it might link up to what the gentleman in the blue 
shirt, the LL.M. student, was talking about perhaps, of contract 
trumping fair use as well, can you use contract as a means to trump 
it.  I think it goes right back to Sonia’s initial framing of it―which 
 
 101 Digital Rights Management. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Rights_ 
Management (last visited Apr. 19, 2007). 
 102 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). 
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is: is this a defense; is it a right; how do you conceive of what fair 
use is?―and then say, “Okay, you should not be able to use 
contract to trump it” or “you should not be able to use DRM to do 
it,” or “you should, but then there are exceptions and so forth.”  
But I think that is an area where the law is not all that clear, 
frankly. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Laura? 
MS. QUILTER: Let me just add another point to this, putting 
on my librarian hat for a moment, because I was a librarian before 
I became an attorney.  That is, that we are in really a tremendously 
tumultuous moment, where we are not just dealing with old rights 
that have already existed simply in different forms.  We are dealing 
with new abilities to manipulate content, new types of content, new 
forms of art, and we have to really come to grips with the fact that 
actually there may not be good metaphors in the old ways for 
doing these things.  We just have to apply our principles to come 
up with the new answers. 
The thing that I am thinking of, in particular, is that most forms 
of DRM actually do not expire.  As a librarian and an archivist, by 
inclination, if not by profession, this is a problem.  So, you can 
look at the Library of Congress’ fabulous works, and the Library of 
Congress for a number of years has been designating a few select 
works of film every year as like really great works of film that we 
should preserve for all time.  But that has left us with thousands 
and millions of films that are decaying, that are basically being lost 
to history, because there simply are not enough resources to 
preserve them. 
DRM is basically creating such a situation for us when we do 
not have the opportunity to circumvent it, and we may not be able 
to, even after copyright expires, if we end up in a situation where 
we cannot preserve things.  I’m thinking not just of the typical 
works of film or whatever, but look at these DVDs. 
I was looking at a CD the other day from the mid-1990s and it 
was a work of art.  It had menuing, it had this whole interface.  
This is a work of art that actually is not going to exist really ever 
again, because CDs as ways of distributing content are kind of 
passé.  We use them to quickly back stuff up, but we are not going 
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to create these elaborate menuing structures, with folding-out 
things and fabulous graphics.  That in itself is a work of art.  I will 
be surprised if we do not in ten years see a real market of 
memorabilia in CD-ROMs from the mid-1990s and early-1990s. 
What are librarians supposed to do with that?  I am telling you 
that in a hundred years CD players are going to be nonexistent in 
libraries.  Librarians and archivists who want to collect and take 
this material need to be able to get access to it; they need to be able 
to circumvent it.  We can come up with individual circumventions 
in particular situations, but that is going to be a problem for us.  If 
you have to circumvent every single type, it is just a big problem. 
So, that is just one tiny example of the kinds of problems that 
this can create when you are bringing in technical protection 
measures.  You have contract on top of that and you have the law 
dealing with all of this.  I think it can create real muddles that are 
not going to adequately protect all of the interests and rights at 
stake with new forms of media and new uses. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay, great. 
Next question? 
QUESTION: Thank you.  My name is David Rigney.  I am an 
attorney in private practice in New York. 
I would like to address a general question to the panel.  That is, 
your views, your experience, in the application of fair use in the 
context of the rights of photographers.  My premise is that the 
issues involved in the reproduction, the transmission of an entire 
work―for example, a photograph―may have a different context 
and flavor from excerpting or otherwise copying from printed 
works. 
Then, as a follow-up to David Carson, if you would comment 
on your views on the status of the orphan rights proposal,103 which, 
as I think you know, is of great concern to photographers 
generally. 
 
 103 Orphan Works Act, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006). 
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PROFESSOR KATYAL: So the questions are, is photography 
different than other types of media and what is the status of the 
orphan works legislation. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Rigney]: And the application of fair use 
principles. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think that generally photographers 
are screwed royally.  That’s just life.  Some people, I don’t know.  
It’s a tough life. 
But no, of course it is not a fair use to take the whole thing 
commercially.  The real thing about photographers is they are in a 
situation where they do not have a lot of money.  They are one of 
these groups that actually, on the other side, really need help to 
protect their rights.  But if you look at the Internet, it is ninety-five 
percent a copyright-free zone, of which five percent of people are 
concerned and doing something about it.  That five percent, 
though, is where the money is made. 
So, photographers have to get into a situation where they can 
protect their rights in that five percent.  If they have the resources, 
then I think the law will protect them.  The question is they are 
small individuals, usually, with a million photographs.  They do 
not even know who is using it half the time.  It is a tough life.  
Maybe they should teach. 
MR. AIKEN: Photographers were big backers of the proposal 
that was floated last year in the spring for a small claims court for 
copyright, and they should be, because their stuff is taken over and 
over again.  The hurdle of getting into federal court is way too high 
for individual photographers, as it is for authors.  We are backers 
of that as well. 
We did a survey of our members about whether they would 
favor a small claims court for copyright.  They are strongly in 
favor of it. 
I think we have to come up with some sort of tribunal that can 
handle these very clear cases of copyright infringement.  Not 
where there is some colorable fair use defense―that should be 
pulled out of such a tribunal―but where there is no colorable fair 
use defense and it is plain infringement, there has to be an easy 
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way for photographers, graphic artists, and individual authors to 
get into court. 
It may be that that sort of tribunal is the place to handle these 
frivolous cease-and-desist letters as well.  I think that might be an 
interesting confluence of interests on both sides of the copyright 
aisle. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: David, did you want to respond to 
the question on the status of the orphan works? 
MR. CARSON: Right.  Well, first of all, current status, I guess, 
was part of your question; is that right? 
QUESTIONER: If that is available. 
MR. CARSON: The current status is it made its way through 
the House Judicial Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Property.  It made its way almost to consideration by 
the full Committee, until Chairman Smith of the Subcommittee 
pulled it, literally at the hearing where he was going to move it 
forward. 
Some people think perhaps he pulled it because he did not 
think it was going to get through the Committee.  That is not what 
he said.  I think what he said is more along the lines this was the 
very end of the Congress; even if it got through this Committee, it 
was not going to get its way all through Congress this year; and he 
knew it was going to require a lot of people to take a tough 
position, because folks like photographers were certainly pushing 
very hard not to enact it. 
It will come back next year.  Is it going to get enacted?  I do 
not know.  But I am reasonably certain that it will be high on the 
agenda of folks in Congress who can make it―not necessarily 
make it happen, but make it get early consideration. 
The photographers have probably been the most vocal 
opponents.  It is easy to understand why.  I may be the last 
remaining person on earth who really liked the 1909 Copyright 
Act.104  I think it was a wonderful law.  I think the notion of 
 
 104 The Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (amended 1976). 
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requiring copyright notice was great.  I think a relatively short 
term, renewable if you wanted it renewed, was wonderful. 
We do not have that anymore.  As a result, you are a copyright 
owner for your life plus seventy years, whether you want to be or 
not.  That is a problem. 
Because the law has been so generous to copyright owners, 
now you can publish your work without worrying about putting a 
copyright notice on it; you can make your work available and put it 
out there without doing anything to make yourself locatable.  I 
think the copyright owners who find themselves in this situation 
bear some of the responsibility for the problem by not really 
making it easy to find them.  “I want to use this work.  I don’t 
know who wrote it.  I don’t know who took the photograph.  Or, 
even if I do, I have no way of finding them now.” 
QUESTIONER: Could I just make a brief response to that? 
MR. CARSON: Of course. 
QUESTIONER: I understand that.  But given the effect of 
digital technology, it is a Catch-22, that if your image is 
misappropriated, if the copyright notice that the photographer and 
his digital archive have placed on it is erased, and then the 
conclusion is reached, “Oh, you were somehow at fault in not 
giving notice,” I think that is a completely illogical and invalid 
conclusion. 
MR. CARSON: I couldn’t agree more.  But nevertheless there 
are things that copyright owners and photographers can do.  It is 
much easier to think about that going forward than it is to think 
about it going backwards, although there are ways to deal with it 
going backwards too. 
One of the things we have been pressing on the representatives 
of photographers is that they need to figure out how you can create 
databases whereby photographers can put their photos up in ways 
that someone who wants to find out who owns the rights to this 
photograph can find out by going to a database, or one of a number 
of databases, searching for it. 
PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807 5/8/2007  1:04:06 PM 
1074 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:1017 
We are told, although I don’t know the facts, that there are 
technologies that actually can allow you to search for images.  I am 
sure that will get better over time. 
The more photographers do, presumably through their own 
organizations, which may have more resources than any individual 
photographer clearly would have, perhaps people will even find 
that this could be a profit-making activity.  If there are places one 
can go when one wants to know who is the owner of the copyright 
in this particular photograph or this particular work, and you can 
go there and you find the owner, then that solves the orphan work 
problem. 
So there are things that can be done, at least in theory.  I am not 
saying it is necessarily easy.  But I know that representatives of 
photographers are seriously looking at it.  That is one of the things 
that we are trying to encourage. 
The idea is not primarily to allow people to use works when 
they cannot find the copyright owner.  If nothing else succeeds, 
okay.  But the idea is to help people find the copyright owner and 
then strike the deal. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay.  So Laura, Paul, and then John 
can respond. 
MS. QUILTER: Two quick comments. 
One is photographers are in a pickle if their work subsists only 
in a printed form.  So the photographer from 1930 who has a print 
photograph, it can be very difficult to track that.  I actually think 
electronic files can really help solve this, because formats can have 
metadata which can include that.  Yes, the metadata can be erased, 
but if somebody signed their name, that can be cropped as well.  
So I actually think electronic photography can be very helpful to 
photographers in terms of keeping their material out there. 
On the arbitrage or alternative dispute resolution, actually I 
want to put in a pitch for § 512.105  I think that it works pretty well 
for small rights holders.  With the § 512(c) provision,106 it is very 
efficient―too efficient―for rights holders in terms of getting their 
 
 105 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
 106 Id. § 512(c). 
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material off of the Internet.  Where I find a problem is that rights 
holders are overbroad and that there is no really effective way to 
respond to that.  But I do think that, in terms of Internet 
distributions, § 512 becomes a cheap and efficient way for rights 
holders to deal with distributions of their content.107 
MR. AIKEN: On orphan works, authors are on both sides of 
the issue.  They’ve got their works, copyrighted works, that they 
do not want being deemed orphan because someone cannot locate 
the author at the moment they are looking.  But they also want to 
make use of stuff that is out there, particularly old letters, diaries, 
things of historic interest.  They want to be able to use that stuff, 
incorporate that into their own works. 
We were not big fans of the orphan works proposal because we 
think it should have made more distinctions between works that 
were clearly created to exploit the commercial value, when you’ve 
got a manuscript or a book that someone was creating to exploit 
the commercial value; as opposed to letters, diaries, notes, where 
there is not that sort of intent.  There should be a distinction in the 
law made between those and how “orphan-able” such works are. 
For photographers, it is a particular problem, because how do 
you distinguish by looking at a photograph whether someone 
intended to commercially exploit it or not?  I do not know how 
often people need to make fair use of a photograph where they 
cannot find the rights holder.  I do not know how often it comes 
up. 
One thing I think that has not been looked at with these orphan 
works proposals is that it essentially creates a duty of availability 
on the copyright holder; it says you have to be available.  It is not a 
problem for the corporate copyright holders.  Big publishers, the 
Hollywood industry, they are going to be available and people will 
find them.  It is a problem for individuals, however, being 
available. 
And it is not just available to people in the United States, 
because our law is intended to incorporate also foreign works.108  
 
 107 See id. § 512. 
 108 See, e.g., id. § 104 (2000). 
PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807 5/8/2007  1:04:06 PM 
1076 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:1017 
Foreign works can be orphaned as well.  Other countries are 
looking at us and seeing what we are doing.  So now we have 
Australia looking at what the United States is doing.  If we pass an 
orphan works law, we can be sure that Australia, England, South 
Africa, India, and China will pass similar laws.  And, since you can 
put stuff on the Internet as a result of these orphan works 
processes, we will have a global duty to be available; and, if you 
are not available, the penalty is your work is put in this quasi-
public domain and you may lose all the value of it.  So I think there 
are a lot of problems with the law as it was proposed. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: John? 
MR. PALFREY: Just since it is important that every member 
of the panel speak on these good questions, of course. 
To your first point, about where is fair use in the context of 
reproduction of photographs, I totally agree with you that there is 
no issue with respect to service standard photographs.  But the 
heat, I think, to follow on Laura’s insight about § 512(d),109 is in 
the search engine space. 
So the two cases, or sort of chain of cases, are Kelly v. Ariba 
Soft110 and then more recently the Perfect 10 case,111 which call 
into question some of what was in that context. 
So I think if you are looking to where is the interesting fair use 
question, it is not so much the standard direct liability; it is actually 
in the direct and secondary liability for intermediaries, who are 
increasingly in this sort of money-making posture, clearly, but then 
also where more pressure is being placed on them.  Joel 
Reidenberg has written about this as well in the Internet law 
context.112 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That is an area where I thought the 
courts did a pretty good job.  The Perfect 10 case was also 
Solomonic in its attempt to give something to each side based on 
 
 109 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (Quilter comments) 
 110 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 111 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 112 Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 583–85 (1998). 
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close factual analysis.113  So I think the courts have basically done 
a good job on fair use when they are actually presented with it.  It 
goes back to the problem of how do we get some of these things 
before them. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Next question? 
QUESTION: Most of the panelists have expressed concern 
about the chilling effect of various things like notices that may be 
against people doing legitimate fair use and the like.  To what 
extent do you think that the uncertainty in the law in some of these 
areas effectively acts as a chilling effect? 
To pick a real example, an author I know is concerned about 
something that she wanted to do that maybe was a transformative 
use.  Now that the Second Circuit has come down with its 
opinion,114 I still have no idea whether it is a transformative use or 
not.  That uncertainty is causing her not to produce the work that 
she was going to produce.  I would be interested in the panelists’ 
views on that. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: The future of transformative use 
under copyright.  Go ahead. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I will say something about 
transformative use.  Transformative use is a derivative work, for 
which there is a right.  So the idea that “if it is transformative, you 
are okay” is crazy.  All that the courts are really trying to talk 
about is transformative in the context of a fair use between 
something that is intrinsic.  The normal use of something that is 
transformative is that there is a thumb down on the scale on the 
transformative. 
There is no case that says if it is transformative it is fair use.  In 
Acuff-Rose, they said, “No, it can be a parody, and it can be news 
reporting, or it can be all these other things that maybe do things 
 
 113 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (“The Court now concludes that Google’s creation 
and public display of ‘thumbnails’ likely do directly infringe [Perfect 10]’s copyrights. 
The Court also concludes, however, that [Perfect 10] is not likely to succeed on its 
vicarious and contributory liability theories.”). 
 114 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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with things.”115  But that does not mean they are fair use.  You still 
have to go through the complete four-factor analysis. 
But what it has morphed into now is “if it is transformative it is 
okay.”  No, it is not okay.  You still have to go through the normal 
fair use analysis.  So just your statement, “it’s transformative but 
she’s not sure she can do it”—of course she shouldn’t be sure that 
she can do it.  You have to look at it very fact-specific in a 
situation.  That is just the way it is. 
MR. CARSON: I think the more accurate statement is if it is 
not transformative, the odds that it is a fair use are relatively low.  
If it is transformative, you may have leapt over one hurdle but 
you’ve still got some other tests to meet. 
MS. QUILTER: I would add that I believe that the chilling 
effect in terms of practice is quite high from the uncertainty.  
Publishers, for instance, are very reluctant to step into situations 
where they have to rely on fair use.  Documentary filmmakers, as 
has been well documented, have a lot of difficulty getting material 
distributed because their distributors, their film festivals, all want 
insurance coverage.116  The insurers are really leery of fair use.  I 
think this story goes on in really almost any form of media. 
I think that anybody who is the gatekeeper, who has some sort 
of role in distributing material, but is not wedded to the material 
and treating it as the child of their heart and their last three years of 
work, does not really have that much of a vested interest in getting 
it out there if there is some risk of liability.  So I think that the 
chilling effect from gatekeepers’ roles is quite significant. 
MR. CARSON: And it is not just people who do not have the 
resources to fight.  Keep in mind most copyright owners are also 
copyright users.  You look at what they do in Hollywood, it is nuts.  
They will pay for anything just to avoid a possible claim.  They 
pay for rights to use things that anyone looking at would say, “Of 
course that is a fair use” or “it is not even infringement in the first 
place.” 
 
 115 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994). 
 116 See, e.g., Boyle et al., supra note 93. 
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But there is this culture where if I can just pay whoever might 
have a claim against me, then I do not have to worry about it down 
the road.  The cost/benefit analysis may or may not make sense, 
but the result is that you do not have the precedent out there, 
whether it is legal or just precedent in terms of what is actually 
going on in the world, that any rational person looking at how 
copyright law really operates would imagine you ought to have. 
Again, it is largely, I think, because of the cost of vindicating 
your rights in our system. 
MR. AIKEN: There definitely is a chilling effect.  That is 
something else we have surveyed our members on.  When faced 
with something where they could not get permission, there is―I 
cannot remember the percentage now―there is a certain 
percentage who just avoid it entirely or paraphrase.  But, a larger 
percentage take a smaller chunk and declare it for themselves to be 
fair use. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: In the back? 
QUESTION: My name is Britton Payne.  I am with the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal. 
I wanted to ask a question about the fourth factor, the effect on 
the marketplace, and direct it particularly to Professor Palfrey, but 
I am certainly curious to hear what everybody has to say. 
Professor Hansen, in talking about the interplay between 
Arriba Soft and Perfect 10, discussed how the court goes into an 
analysis of the market impact of the use of thumbnails in search 
engines.117  It says that because you can use a thumbnail-size 
photograph on a cell phone and there is a potential market for that, 
it is an inappropriate use under the fourth-factor analysis of fair 
use.118 
But what, really, is the marketplace that we should be looking 
at in terms of temporality?  Soon enough your cell phone image is 
 
 117 Compare Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821–22 (9th Cir. 2003), with 
Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 850–51; see also Britton Payne, Comment, Imperfect 
10: Digital Advances and Market Impact in Fair Use Analysis, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279 (2006). 
 118 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851. 
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going to be far more complex than the thumbnail image that you 
would see in a Google image search.  When we look at the 
Grokster concurrences, we have Breyer saying, “look to forever in 
the future.”119 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Forget about Breyer. 
QUESTIONER [Mr. Payne]: And we have Ginsburg saying, 
“Look to right now and the present uses.”120  So really what is the 
appropriate limitation in the marketplace that we are looking at in 
terms of temporality? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think it depends on whether you are 
someone who is basically property based, and then the effect on 
the market is going to be very strong; and if you are someone who 
is not property-based, it is not going to be very strong, because you 
are for redistribution of wealth probably in many areas, including 
copyright.  I mean you scratch any of the Copy Left—they are left.  
That is why they are called Copy Left.  The irony, of course, is that 
the Copy Right are also left.  So there is this weird thing where 
most people in the copyright industry outside of copyright are for 
redistribution of wealth.  There is just almost a tribal split between 
them when one side is trying to redistribute the other’s wealth. 
But if you want to know the truth, forget Breyer and Stevens.  
If you are looking at what the future holds, they aren’t the future.  
What they say is nice or not nice, but it almost has no effect. 
Breyer, or at least his clerks, seems to want Breyer to be the 
“Copy Left Hero.”  His concurrence in Grokster had all the 
earmarks of a typically clerk-written opinion.  But, in any case, I 
do not think he has influence, in the area of IP, on the other justices 
of the Court. 
So if you want to look at the Court, look at Ginsburg, who is 
probably the one that you should pay the most attention to.  We 
will see what the new Justices do. 
 
 119 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 952–54 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 120 Id. at 945–48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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Another example of the strong concern for market harm is clear 
in Acuff-Rose.121  Everybody thinks Acuff-Rose was a win for 
Luther Campbell, finding fair use for his “parody.”  It was not a 
win for Luther Campbell at all. The Court remanded for 
consideration of the effect of Campell’s use of the song on the 
potential licensing of “Pretty Woman” to the hip-hop market.122  
That is an incredible concern.  The idea that the song was going to 
be licensed to the hip-hop market is almost ridiculous, but that was 
the remand.  That is how concerned the Court was with the impact 
on a potential market for “Pretty Woman.” 
I think potentially the fourth factor—I think O’Connor was 
right in Harper & Row,123 even though to some extent Souter 
pooh-poohed it in Acuff-Rose124—that fourth factor is the killer 
factor.  As soon as there is competition, someone is using the work 
to compete with you, which is really what the fourth factor is: I 
think you are almost always going to lose in fair use. 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: John, do you want to comment? 
MR. PALFREY: Sure.  There is good reason that you are in 
charge of the Journal, and it is a great question. 
I think that there is no doubt but that the heat here is on the 
fourth factor and no doubt that much of the uncertainty in the 
application of fair use—which cynics call the right to hire a 
lawyer, of course—is in how do you define the market?  I think it 
is analogous to the antitrust base, where the first thing you have to 
look at and ask is, “What’s the market we are talking about for this 
monopoly?”  It is really hard to do.  I think the courts are all over 
the place. 
The thing that makes me uncomfortable with the Perfect 10 
Solomonic opinion is just what you note, which is sometimes in 
the digital space―I guess always in the digital space―you have to 
 
 121 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 122 Id. at 594. 
 123 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“[The 
fair use fourth factor of market impact] is undoubtedly the single most important element 
of fair use”). 
 124 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572. 
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freeze a moment in time and look at a technology as it stands right 
now.125 
I think we are in a time of enormous transformation.  This 
notion of the image as it applies on the cell phone, clearly we have 
convergence of accessing digital space from all these different 
devices.  I think it is very hard to rely on that as the way to think 
about the market.  But I do not have a good answer.  It is an 
excellent question, and maybe there is a note or a journal article or 
something in it.126 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Just leave Breyer out of it.127 
PROFESSOR KATYAL: It looks like our time is up.  Thanks 
so much to everyone.  For those of you who didn’t get a chance to 
ask questions, there will be a reception outside so you can follow 
up. 
 
 125 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  See also Payne, 
supra note 117, at 290–91. 
 126 See Payne, supra note 117. 
 127 See contra id. 
